implementation of the Torture Convention, and further failure to comply with the reporting guidelines of the Committee in this regard.”134 The judge, however, went further than merely assessing al-Jailani’s individual risk of torture or ill-treatment. He concluded that sending al-Jailani back would also have broader policy implications. Returning al-Jailani would not only violate the U.S.’s Convention against Torture obligations, “but could also be construed as sanctioning Yemen’s use of torture by its security forces thereby bringing the United States into disrepute in the international community.”135 Despite all this, the judge determined that assurances that al-Jailani would not be tortured would be sufficient to justify his removal to Yemen if they could be deemed credible. It is difficult to see how any assurances from a government with Yemen’s record of torture could be considered credible or reliable. But the loopholes noted above with respect to the U.S. regulations almost surely account for this apparently contradictory ruling. When the judge found that credible assurances would permit alJailani’s removal to Yemen, he was simply following the regulations that apply in immigration proceedings.136 The executive branch’s discretion to secure and evaluate diplomatic assurances leave open the very real possibility that it would deem assurances from Yemen to be credible. Also, because al-Jailani enjoys no procedural rights in relation to diplomatic assurances under the regulations, he would not be entitled to challenge the assurances in a court. Yemen not only routinely violates the prohibition against torture, but as noted in the alJailani decision, openly admits that it deems such abuses to be necessary in its efforts to combat terrorism. Under these circumstances, diplomatic assurances from the Yemeni authorities would be inherently unreliable and should not be acceptable as a safeguard against torture. Moreover, if the U.S. were to return al-Jailani to Yemen based on assurances, the policy considerations so eloquently articulated in the decision still obtain: accepting assurances for the protection of one person could be perceived as sanctioning Yemen’s abusive practices for the vast majority of persons vulnerable to torture and illtreatment. 134 Ibid., p. 12: “The Committee faults Yemen for invoking any justification for using torture, including its fight against terrorism and difficulties associated with this serious problem. Of particular interest to this court is the Committee’s concern that Yemen has failed to establish a comprehensive definition of torture, and faulted the government for the lack of transparency in its detention centers operated by its security forces.” 135 Ibid., p. 14 136 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c)(3) - Diplomatic assurances against torture obtained by the Secretary of State. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17 NO. 4(D) 46