68 United Nations Convention Against Torture and its Optional Protocol 147 Another interpretation has been advocated by a number of predominantly Western Governments during the drafting process and by means of declarations of interpretation. According to this opinion, the word ‘lawful’ refers to both domestic and international law.272 In other words, a Government may only invoke the lawful sanctions clause if a certain sanction is in conformity with its own domestic law and with international law. But what are the relevant standards of international law? One would first have to think of Article 16 CAT, Articles 7 and 10 CCPR, and the prohibition of all forms of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as a rule of customary international law. Even when a State party to the CAT has not ratified the CCPR and does not accept the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as a rule of customary international law, it is still bound by the provision of Article 16 CAT which does not contain a lawful sanctions clause.273 148  Nigel Rodley in his function as UN Special Rapporteur on Torture in 1997 took the view that the lawful sanctions exclusion must necessarily refer to those sanctions that constitute practices widely accepted as legitimate by the international community, such as deprivation of liberty through imprisonment, which is common to almost all penal systems. Deprivation of liberty, however unpleasant, as long as it comports with basic internationally accepted standards, such as those set forth in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, is no doubt a lawful sanction.274 149  Of course, imprisonment after conviction by a competent and independent court is a lawful sanction as it constitutes one of the explicit exceptions to the right to personal liberty.275 It is difficult to see how lawful imprisonment, which adheres to international standards and domestic law, can amount to torture as defined in Article 1 CAT, but there could be individual cases, where all elements of Article 1 are fulfilled, even though the application in such cases was not necessarily envisaged in the travaux préparatoires. The reason why Article 1 could apply in ‘normal’ prison settings, is that even a detention setting that adheres to international and domestic standards, can be a traumatic experience and inflict severe mental suffering for some individuals.276 Other elements of Article 1 would usually not be fulfilled in such cases: while there will often be the purpose to punish the individual, normally, there would not be an intent to inflict pain or suffering with such a prison sentence, especially in restorative justice systems. However, in retributive systems, there might be an intent to inflict suffering through a prison sentence and together with the purpose of punishment, this might lead to severe suffering being inflicted through one (or several) public official(s). Should indeed all domestic and international standards be fulfilled—​and only then—​the application of the lawful sanction clause might in fact be warranted, as otherwise a prison sentence as such might not 272   This interpretation is also sometimes found in legal literature: cf eg Ingelse (n 90) 216 who called the lawful sanctions clause ‘a monstrosity’. 273   Such a provision has been discussed in the Working Group but was finally not adopted. See Burgers and Danelius (n 32) 74: ‘Nor was any conclusion reached on the suggestion to insert in article 16 a provision which would exclude suffering due to lawful sanctions from the scope of this article.’ 274   SRT (Rodley) E/​CN.4/​1997/​7 (n 112) para 8. This view is also taken by Yuval Ginbar, ‘Making Human Rights Sense of the Torture Definition’ in Başoğlu (n 120) 284ff. 275   eg art 5(1)(a) ECHR. 276   Ginbar (n 274) 284–​85. See also Craig Haney and Shirin Bakhshay, ‘Contexts of Ill-​Treatment: The Relationship of Captivity and Prison Confinement to Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment and Torture’ in Başoğlu (n 120). Zach