enhances the capacity of governments, companies and individuals to undertake surveillance, interception and data collection, which may violate or abuse human rights”.359 Similarly, the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers has noted that “[d]ata processing in the information society which is carried out without the necessary safeguards and security can raise major human rights related concerns. Legislation allowing broad surveillance of citizens can be found contrary to the right to respect of private life. These capabilities and practices can have a chilling effect on citizen participation in social, cultural and political life and, in the longer term, could have a damaging effect on democracy.”360 New methods of surveillance and the infiltration of computer systems to detect the personal weaknesses of targeted individuals with a view to undermining their credibility and reputation pose further threats, since such tools may “also be used to undermine, for example, opposition politicians, human rights activists or journalists.”361 248. T he UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to free- dom of opinion and expression has raised concern about blanket exceptions to the requirement of judicial authorization that national intelligence agencies enjoy in many countries, including in OSCE participating States.362 He has stressed that, without adequate legislation and legal standards to ensure the privacy, security and anonymity of communications, journalists, human rights defenders and whis359  See A/RES/68/167, adopted on 18 December 2013, preamble. 360  See “Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on Risks to Fundamental Rights stemming from Digital Tracking and other Surveillance Technologies”, adopted on 11 June 2013, para. 2. 361  See Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, “’Massive Eavesdropping’ and ‘Additional Protocol to the ECHR on Protection of whistleblowers’, Introductory memorandum by the Rapporteur Pieter Omtzigt”, Netherlands, AS/JUR (2014) 02, 23 January 2014, para. 21. 362  See A/HRC/23/40, para. 59. Specifically, he referred in this context to the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that empowered the National Security Agency to intercept communications without judicial authorization, as well as to laws in Germany and Sweden allowing for wiretaps and interception without a warrant. In its 2009 Concluding Observations on Sweden, the Human Rights Committee also noted that the “Law on Signals Intelligence in Defence Operations” afforded the executive wide powers of surveillance with respect to electronic communications and recommended that the “State party should take all appropriate measures to ensure that the gathering, storage and use of personal data not be subject to any abuses, not be used for purposes contrary to the Covenant, and be consistent with obligations under article 17 of the Covenant. To that effect, the State party should guarantee that the processing and gathering of information be subject to review and supervision by an independent body with the necessary guarantees of impartiality and effectiveness.” See CCPR/C/SWE/CO/6, 7 May 2009, para. 18. In its 2014 Concluding Observations on the USA adopted on 26 March 2014, the UN Human Rights Committee expressed concern about the surveillance of communications conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA), and noted that the system of oversight of the NSA’s activities failed to protect the rights of those affected, while the latter have no access to effective remedies in case of abuse. The Committee called on the state party to ensure that its surveillance activities fully conform with its obligations under the ICCPR, including Article 17, and more specifically that any interference “be authorized by laws that (i) are publicly accessible; (ii) contain provisions that ensure that collection of, access to and use of communications data are tailored to specific legitimate aims; (iii) are sufficiently precise specifying in detail the precise circumstances in which any such interference may be permitted; the procedures for authorizing; the categories of persons who may be placed under surveillance; limits on the duration of surveillance; procedures for the use and storage of the data collected; and (iv) provide for effective safeguards against abuse”. See UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, para. 22 (advance unedited version). The Committee had previously expressed concern in its 2006 Concluding Observations on the USA over the monitoring of communication, including by the NSA, without judicial or other independent oversight. See CCPR/C/USA/CO/3, 15 September 2006, para. 21. 114 Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders