and was not accessible to the public, the Court ruled that the interference was incompatible with the ECHR.367 As regards the gathering and storage of personal information in general, the Human Rights Committee stressed that “every individual should have the right to ascertain in an intelligible form, whether, and if so, what personal data is stored in automatic data files, and for what purposes. Every individual should also be able to ascertain which public authorities or private individuals or bodies control or may control their files.”368 250. Participating States have a duty both to ensure that public authorities or officials refrain from engaging in any unlawful or arbitrary interference with the right to private life, but also to protect human rights defenders from similar interference by third parties, including by private security agents, for example.369 The UN Human Rights Committee has stated that the right to private life “is required to be guaranteed against all such interference and attacks whether they emanate from State authorities or from natural or legal persons.”370 251. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression has pointed out that states should criminalize illegal surveillance by public or private actors.371 In this regard, the UNGA has called on states to undertake the following: to respect and protect the right to privacy, including in the context of digital communication; to take measures to put an end to and create conditions to prevent violations; to “review their procedures, practices and legislation regarding the surveillance of communications, their interception and the collection of personal data, including mass surveillance, interception and collection”; and to “establish or maintain existing independent, effective domestic oversight mechanisms capable of ensuring transparency, as appropriate, and accountability for State surveillance […]”.372 367  According to the judgement in Shimovolos v. Russia, an extract from the list of persons registered in that database showed that the applicant’s name was included in a section entitled “Human Rights Activists”; and “[t]he Surveillance Database contains information about skinheads, human rights activists and other persons allegedly involved in extremist activities. Whenever a person mentioned in the database purchases a train or aeroplane ticket the Interior Department of Transport receives an automatic notification.” Since the legal basis was not published and accessible, “[t]he grounds for registration of a person’s name in the database, the authorities competent to order such registration, the duration of the measure, the precise nature of the data collected, the procedures for storing and using the collected data and the existing controls and guarantees against abuse are thus not open to public scrutiny and knowledge” (para. 69). 368  See General Comment No. 16, para. 10. 369  In the report on her visit to Ireland, for example, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders noted that she had received reports of surveillance of public roads, private houses and private movements of local residents by private security agents employed by a large business corporation in the context of protests concerning environmental rights. She expressed concerns about the possible impact of such practices on the right to privacy and recommended that surveillance methods be employed only in a lawful and proportionate manner, and that their purpose be communicated to the local residents. See “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Margaret Sekaggya, Addendum. Mission to Ireland (19-23 November 2012)”, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/47/Add.3, 26 February 2013, para. 78. 370  General Comment No. 16, para. 1. 371  See HRC/C/23/40, para. 84. 372  See A/RES/68/167, para. 4. 116 Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders