CCPR/C/112/D/1906/2009 7.3 The Committee takes note of the argument of the State party that the communication is inadmissible since it was submitted to the Committee by third parties and not by the alleged victim himself. In that respect, the Committee recalls that rule 96 (b) of its rules of procedure states that a communication should normally be submitted by the individual personally or by a representative of that individual, but that a communication submitted on behalf of an alleged victim may, however, be accepted when it appears that the individual in question is unable to submit the communication personally. 11 In the present case, the Committee notes that the alleged victim was detained on death row at the time of the submission and that the communication was submitted on behalf of the alleged victim by his counsel, who presented a duly signed power of attorney to represent him before the Committee. Accordingly, the Committee is not precluded by article 1 of the Optional Protocol from examining the communication. 7.4 The Committee takes note of the argument of the State party that Mr. Yuzepchuk had not exhausted all domestic remedies at the time of submission of the communication, in view of the fact that he had not submitted an application for a supervisory review by the Supreme Court. The State party also argued that this constituted an abuse of the right of submission of a communication. The Committee considers that filing requests for a supervisory review to the President of a court against court decisions which have entered into force and depend on the discretionary power of a judge, constitute an extraordinary remedy and that the State party must show that there is a reasonable prospect that such requests would provide an effective remedy in the circumstances of the case. 12 The State party has not shown, however, whether and in how many cases the petition to the President of the Supreme Court for supervisory review procedures have been applied successfully in cases concerning the right to a fair trial. Moreover, on 23 March 2010, the author’s lawyer, acting on his behalf, appealed to the President of the Supreme Court of Belarus for a supervisory review, but the request was rejected on 26 April 2010. In such circumstances, the Committee finds that it is not precluded by article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol from considering the present communication. 7.5 The Committee takes notes of the author’s allegations that he was discriminated against, based on his Roma ethnicity, in violation of his rights under articles 14, paragraph 2, and26 of the Covenant. However, in the absence of further explanations or evidence in support of those claims, the Committee finds them insufficiently substantiated for purposes of admissibility and declares them inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 7.6 The Committee considers that the author’s remaining claims, raising issues under articles 6, paragraphs 1 and 2; 7; 9, paragraph 3; and14, paragraphs 1, and 3 (e) and (g), of the Covenant, have been sufficiently substantiated for purposes of admissibility and proceeds to their examination on the merits. Consideration of the merits 8.1 The Human Rights Committee has considered this communication in the light of all the information received, in accordance with article 5, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol. 11 12 8 See, inter alia, Kovaleva and Kozyar v. Belarus, para. 10.2. See communications No. 836/1998, Gelazauskas v. Lithuania, Views adopted on 17 March 2003, para 7.4; No. 1851/2008, Sekerko v. Belarus, Views adopted on 28 October 2013, para. 8.3; No. 1919-1920/2009, Alexander Protsko and Andrei Tolchin v. Belarus, Views adopted on 1 November 2013, para. 6.5, No. 1784/2008, Schumilin v. Belarus, Views adopted on 23 July 2012, para. 8.3; and No. 1814/2008, P.L. v. Belarus, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 26 July 2011, para. 6.2.