CCPR/C/112/D/1906/2009 which does not include a public hearing, does not permit the supervisory review procedure to be treated as an effective remedy. 5.2 The counsel for the author further submits that, although the legislation provides for the possibility of filing applications for a supervisory review and a presidential pardon, it does not regulate the length of such proceedings, nor provide for a procedure to inform the applicant of their outcome. In practice, in death penalty cases, the applicant is informed that his appeals have been rejected only minutes before execution. The outcome of such applications is also kept secret from the lawyers and families of those convicted. The counsel for the author also submits that the death penalty in Belarus is administered secretly and neither the convict, nor his lawyers or family are informed beforehand of the date of the execution. Accordingly, a person sentenced to death has no real possibility of submitting a communication to the Committee after his applications for a supervisory review and a presidential pardon have been rejected. 5.3 The counsel for the author submits that the author submitted an application for a presidential pardon on 16 October 2009 with the assistance of his lawyer. On 23 March 2010, his lawyer, acting on the author’s behalf, appealed to the Chair of the Supreme Court of Belarus for a supervisory review, which was rejected on 26 April 2010. Issues and proceedings before the Committee The State party’s lack of cooperation and failure to respect the Committee’s request for interim measures 6.1 The Committee notes the submission of the State Party that there are no legal grounds for consideration of the present communication insofar as it is registered in violation of articles 2 and 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol, because the alleged victim did not present the communication himself and has failed to exhaust domestic remedies; that it has no obligations regarding the recognition of the rules of procedure of the Committee and its interpretation of the provisions of the Optional Protocol; and that it has no obligation to respect the request by the Committee for interim measures. 6.2 The Committee recalls that article 39, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights authorizes it to establish its own rules of procedure, which States parties have agreed to recognize. The Committee further observes that, by adhering to the Optional Protocol, a State party to the Covenant recognizes the competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.6 Implicit in the adherence of a State to the Optional Protocol is an undertaking to cooperate with the Committee in good faith, so as to permit and enable it to consider such communications and, after examination, to forward its Views to the State party and to the individual concerned.7 It is incompatible with its obligations under article 1 of the Optional Protocol for a State party to take any action that would prevent or frustrate the Committee in its consideration and examination of the communication and in the expression of its Views.8 6.3 In the present case, the Committee observes that, when submitting the communication on 2 October 2009, the author informed the Committee that he had been 6 7 8 6 Preamble and art. 1 of the Optional Protocol. Art. 5, paras. 1 and 4, of the Optional Protocol. See, inter alia, communications No. 869/1999, Piandiong et al. v. the Philippines, Views adopted on 19 October 2000, para. 5.1; and Nos. 1461/2006, 1462/2006, 1476/2006 and 1477/2006, Maksudov et al. v. Kyrgyzstan, Views adopted on 16 July 2008, paras. 10.1–10.3.