CAT/C/67/D/816/2017 present case, the State party has not contested that the complainants have exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee therefore finds that it is not precluded from considering the communication under article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention. 7.3 The Committee notes that the State party has contested the admissibility of the complaint on the grounds that the complainants’ claims are manifestly unfounded. In the light of the information on file and the arguments presented by the parties, the Committee considers that, for purpose of admissibility, the complainants have sufficiently substantiated their claims, which raise substantive issues under the Convention. 7.4 As the Committee finds no further obstacles to admissibility, it declares the complaint submitted under article 3 of the Convention admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 8.1 In accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, the Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties concerned. 8.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the return of the complainants to Egypt would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 8.3 In the present case, the Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainants would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to Egypt. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances.4 8.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 in the context of article 22, according to which the non-refoulement obligation exists whenever there are “substantial grounds” for believing that the person concerned would be in danger of being subjected to torture in a State to which he or she is facing deportation, either as an individual or as a member of a group which may be at risk of being tortured in the State of destination. The Committee recalls that “substantial grounds” exist whenever the risk of torture is “foreseeable, personal, present and real” (para. 11). Indications of personal risk may include, but are not limited to: the complainant’s ethnic background; political affiliation or political activities of the complainant or the complainant’s family members; arrest and/or detention without guarantee of a fair treatment and trial; incommunicado detention or other form of arbitrary and illegal detention in the country of origin; and religious affiliation (para. 45). With respect to the merits of a communication submitted under article 22 of the Convention, the burden of proof is upon the author of the communication, who must present an arguable case, that is, submit substantiated arguments showing that the danger of being subjected to torture is foreseeable, present, personal and real (para. 38). The Committee also recalls that it gives considerable weight to finds of fact made by organs of the State party concerned; however, it is not bound by such findings, as it can make a free assessment of the information available to it 4 6 See, inter alia, S.K. and others v. Sweden (CAT/C/54/D/550/2013), para. 7.3.