OSCE/ODIHR Opinion on the Draft Act on the Independent National Human Rights Institution of Iceland NHRI should be granted unannounced and free access to inspect and examine any public premises, documents, equipment and assets without prior written notice. These aspects should be directly and properly reflected in the text of the Draft Act. 39. At the same time, Article 7 further states that “the Institution cannot require information relating to the State’s internal or external security or foreign affairs that should be kept secret, except with the permission of the cabinet minister in question”. Generally, the Sub-Committee on Accreditation considers that an NHRI’s mandate should allow it to conduct a full investigation of all alleged human rights violations, including those involving the military, police and security officers. While limitations relating to national security concerns are not inherently contrary to the Paris Principles, they should not be unreasonably or arbitrarily applied and it should be possible to challenge a refusal to communicate so-called “secret” information.43 Hence, in case the cabinet minister refuses access to such information, there should be a possibility for the NHRI to appeal such a decision before a competent independent body. 40. Moreover, the Draft Act does not foresee specific sanctions for hindering the NHRI in its work. In this context, it may be beneficial to discuss further ways of strengthening the NHRI’s mandate to compel authorities to provide requested information.44 To ensure this, the power to request information, which is central to the proper execution of the NHRI’s mandate, should be supported by specific sanctions, which should be specified in the Draft Act.45 Such sanctions should be adequate, meaning that they should not be excessive and at the same time serious enough to dissuade public officials (and possibly representatives of other entities) from ignoring the NHRI’s requests. Alternatively, at a minimum, other applicable legislation should be cross-referenced in the Draft Act. 4. The Board of Directors of the NHRI 4.1. Appointment of the Board of Directors 41. Article 4 of the Draft Act provides that the “Althingi elects five members of the Board of Directors of the Institution and an equal number of alternates for a term of five years” and that the Board members “shall have expertise in different fields, including human rights law”. 42. General Observation 1.8 requires that the NHRI legislation or other binding instruments provide for the formalisation of a clear, transparent and participatory selection and appointment process of the NHRI’s decision-making body, which promotes merit-based selection and pluralism. This aims to ensure the independence of, and public confidence in the senior leadership of the institution. Moreover, the process for the selection and appointment of an NHRI’s decision-making body should be made on the basis of predetermined, objective and publicly-available criteria which should be clearly stated in relevant legislation or other binding legal instruments. 43 44 45 of charge from the authorities as he or she deems necessary, as well as the right to obtain the required copies or printouts of the documents and files of the authorities and other subjects”. See e.g., op. cit. footnote 28, page 49 (SCA Report and Recommendations of May 2016). See op. cit. footnote 14, page 149 (2010 UNDP-OHCHR Toolkit for Collaboration with National Human Rights Institutions). See e.g., par Venice Commission, Opinion on the draft Constitutional Law on the Human Rights Defender of Armenia, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 109th Session (Venice, 9-10 December 2016), CDL-AD(2016)033, par 29, available at http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)033-e. 14