OSCE/ODIHR Opinion on the Draft Act on the Independent National Human Rights Institution of Iceland 54. Further, the Draft Act does not elaborate on the circumstances in which the mandate of the members of the Board may be terminated prior to the expiry of their term. Clear regulations are also needed for cases where the Chairperson is not able to perform his/her duties due to certain circumstances such as resignation, death, illness, conviction for a serious criminal offence, etc. It would be advisable to specify such cases in the Draft Act. There is also no provision in the Draft Act governing the interim period pending the election of a Chairperson’s successor when the Chairperson is not able to carry out his/her functions. This is of particular importance as the Draft Act does not provide for a Vice-Chairperson of the Board. 55. Additionally, according to General Observation 2.1, in order to address the Paris Principles’ requirements for a stable mandate, without which there can be no independence, NHRI legislation must contain an objective dismissal process following pre-defined criteria, similar to that accorded to members of other independent State agencies. The grounds for dismissal must be clearly defined and appropriately confined to those actions and situations which impact adversely on the capacity of the members to fulfill their mandates.65 Where appropriate, the legislation should specify that the application of a particular ground for dismissal must be supported by the decision of a court or other independent body with appropriate jurisdiction.66 The legal drafters should supplement the Draft Act accordingly. 56. As regards the procedure for dismissal, a vote by a qualified majority of the Parliament – preferably higher than the majority required for election67 – would be desirable to avoid a situation where it is possible to remove members from office simply because the majority in Parliament does not agree with their actions.68 Moreover, the Draft Act should provide for a public procedure whereby the members of the Board should be heard prior to the vote on dismissal; there should also be a procedure in place allowing them to challenge the dismissal decisions in court.69 4.3. Other Comments 57. According to applicable international good practice, to protect the NHRI’s real and perceived independence, members of its decision-making body should not take part in decisions in cases where they may have an actual or perceived conflict of interest. On several occasions, the Sub-Committee on Accreditation has encouraged NHRIs to advocate for the inclusion of express legal provisions protecting against such conflicts of interest.70 Members should be required to disclose conflicts of interest and to withdraw from discussions and decisions where these arise. The Draft Act should be supplemented accordingly. 58. While Article 4 par 1 leaves the question of remuneration of Board members to the discretion of the Presidium of the Althingi, it would be preferable, and more in keeping with the independence of the NHRI, if the terms of remuneration would be stated 65 66 67 68 69 70 General Observation 2.1. ibid. Venice Commission, Opinion on the Law on the People's Advocate (Ombudsman) of the Republic of Moldova, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 103rd Plenary Meeting (Venice, 19-20 June 2015), CDL-AD(2015)017, par 60, available at http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2015)017-e. Venice Commission, the Commissioner for Human Rights and the Directorate General of Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Joint Opinion on the Draft Law on the Ombudsman of Serbia, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 61st Plenary Session (Venice, 3-4 December 2004), CDL-AD(2004)041, par 19, available at http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2004)041-e. See e.g., op. cit. footnote 67, par 61 (2015 Venice Commission’s Opinion on the Law on the People's Advocate of Moldova). See e.g., op. cit. footnote 29, pages 16 and 31 (SCA Report and Recommendations of May 2016). 18