CAT/C/65/D/765/2016 6.2 The Committee recalls that, in accordance with article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention, it shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that the individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee notes that, in the present case, the State party has not challenged the admissibility of the communication on this ground. 6.3 The Committee considers that the present communication, in which the complainant claims to face a risk of being arrested, interrogated and subjected to torture or ill-treatment if he were returned to Ethiopia, due to his suspected affiliation with the Oromo Liberation Front in his country of origin and his dissident activities in his country of asylum, raises substantive issues under article 3 of the Convention as the facts and the basis of the complainant’s claims reach the level of substantiation required for the purposes of admissibility.15 In the absence of any objection from the State party as to the admissibility of the present communication, the Committee finds no obstacles and declares it admissible. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention. 7.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the return of the complainant to Ethiopia would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 (1) of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 7.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to Ethiopia. 7.4 In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the complainant would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 16 7.5 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, according to which the Committee will assess “substantial grounds” and consider the risk of torture as foreseeable, personal, present and real when the existence of credible facts relating to the risk by itself, at the time of its decision, would affect the rights of the complainant under the Convention in case of his or her deportation. Indications of personal risk may include, but are not limited to: (a) the complainant’s ethnic background; (b) political affiliation or political activities of the complainant or his or her family members; (c) arrest or detention without guarantee of a fair treatment and trial; and (d) sentence in absentia (para. 45). With respect to the merits of a communication submitted under article 22 of the Convention, the burden of proof is upon the author of the communication, who must present an arguable case, that is, submit substantiated arguments showing that the danger of being subjected to torture is foreseeable, present, personal and real (para. 38).17 The Committee also recalls that it gives considerable weight to findings of fact made by organs of the State party concerned, however it is not bound by such findings, as it can make a free assessment of the 15 16 17 See, for example, K.A. v. Sweden (CAT/C/39/D/308/2006), para. 7.2. See, for example, E.K.W. v. Finland (CAT/C/54/D/490/2012), para. 9.3. See, for example, T.Z. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/62/D/688/2015), para. 8.4. 9