E/CN.4/1994/31 page 6 (c) The consistency of the information with information on other cases from the country in question that has come to the Special Rapporteur’s attention; (d) The existence of authoritative reports of torture practices from national sources, such as official commissions of inquiry; (e) The findings of other international bodies, such as United Nations country rapporteurs and representatives, the Human Rights Committee, the Committee against Torture and regional human rights bodies, in particular, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; (f) The existence of national legislation, such as that permitting prolonged incommunicado detention, that can have the effect of facilitating torture; and (g) The threat of extradition or deportation, directly or indirectly, to a State or territory where one or more of the above elements are present. 8. The above is not intended to be an exhaustive list. Nor will the urgent appeals generally identify which factors the Special Rapporteur has borne in mind. This is because the Special Rapporteur considers it necessary that he bring his judegment to bear on the case at hand and that the principle of safeguarding human dignity and the integrity of the person dictates that he err on the side of protection of potential victims under his mandate rather than on the side of avoiding administrative inconvenience for Governments. Further, the more the appeals were to contain formal substantiation for their having been sent, the more they would begin to resemble accusations. Such an effect would be incompatible with the preventive nature and purpose of the urgent appeal procedure. 9. With regard to the transmittal of information alleging violations of the prohibition of treatment within the Special Rapporteur’s mandate, the Special Rapporteur has continued to send summaries of information giving cause for concern to Governments. As a result of the gap between the resignation of Mr. Peter Kooijmans and the appointment of his successor, it was only possible to begin processing and transmittal of letters containing such information in August 1993. Further letters were sent in October/November 1993. In general, it was only possible to send one letter to any particular Government, regardless of the incidence and quality of the information addressed to the Special Rapporteur. This is an unfortunate situation; first, because it is desirable for Governments to be in possession of relevant information as expeditiously as possible and, second, because when information is transmitted later in the year, little time is left for the receipt of a response susceptible of being reflected in the Special Rapporteur’s report for the year in question. This leads to even an initial exchange of correspondence being spread across more than one report. This, in turn, makes it difficult for a reader to obtain a properly balanced perspective concerning the original allegations or to assess the significance of any later governmental response. Moreover, much information that arrives after the transmittal of a letter to a Government must then wait until the following year before being transmitted to that Government. Further, if any response from a Government seems to the