CAT/C/66/D/757/2016 8.6 The Committee also takes note of the State party’s arguments that the complainant would be able to return with her mother and brothers to the area where her mother spent most of her life and with which she is familiar because the risk of female genital mutilation being carried out depends mainly on the attitude of the family and, most particularly, on the attitude of the mother, and that the complainant’s mother could be expected to go and live elsewhere in Côte d’Ivoire since in large parts of the country female genital mutilation is disapproved of and is not practiced widely. The State party considers that the complainant’s mother can live independently and care for her children; the fact that she is a single parent does not alter this, as she is more highly educated than the average Ivorian woman and she was able to avoid her own re-cutting, leave her family and community and flee to Europe. The Committee also notes the State party’s argument that the complainant’s mother never raised her psychological issues in her own asylum application, that she has not submitted her medical information under section 64 of the Aliens Act 2000 even though she was repeatedly asked to provide that information by the State party and that her medical issues and suicide attempts took place only after the complainant’s asylum application was denied. 8.7 The Committee recalls that female genital mutilation causes permanent physical harm and severe psychological pain to the victims, which may last for the rest of their lives, and considers that the practice of subjecting a woman to female genital mutilation is contrary to the obligations enshrined in the Convention. 21 The Committee also recalls that the so-called “internal flight alternative”, as suggested by the State party, is not always a reliable or effective remedy.22 8.8 While assessing whether “substantial grounds” exist for believing that a person would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported,23 the Committee observes that it is not disputed that the complainant belongs to the Malinke ethnic group, as does her mother, who lived in Côte d’Ivoire until 2011 and who was herself made to undergo female genital mutilation at the age of 19, nor is it disputed that, despite legislation punishing female genital mutilation, it is practised throughout Côte d’Ivoire by various ethnic groups, and its prevalence is especially high among certain ethnic groups in the north and northwest of the country. The complainant submits that the State party’s authorities have failed to take duly into account the risk she would face if removed to Côte d’Ivoire, since the local authorities there will not be able to provide her with protection. She supports her claim by referring to the fact that there have been only 10 instances when the authorities were able to intervene in initiation rites over 10 months in 2013. The Committee also notes that according to the 2013 and 2017 reports submitted by the State party, the percentage of women who have undergone female genital mutilation in Côte d’Ivoire is falling and that over 80 per cent of the population is opposed to continuing that tradition. For example, if the prevalence of female genital mutilation among women aged 45–49 is 46.9 per cent, among 15–19-year-olds it has fallen to 31.3 per cent and among girls under 15 years of age it is 11 per cent. The State party also refers to the successful prosecution by the Government of Côte d’Ivoire in some female genital mutilation cases in 2017. Against that background, the Committee observes that the complainant has failed to show that someone in her family specifically will pressure her mother, who is clearly against female genital mutilation, into practicing the procedure, which will put her at real and personal risk of being subjected to such mutilation. 9. The Committee refers to paragraph 38 of its general comment No. 4, according to which the burden of presenting an arguable case lies with the complainant. In the Committee’s opinion, the complainant has not discharged that burden of proof in the present case. 10. The Committee therefore concludes that the complainant has not adduced sufficient grounds for it to believe that she would run a real, foreseeable, personal and present risk of being subjected to torture upon returning to Côte d’Ivoire. 21 22 23 10 See R.O. v. Sweden (CAT/C/59/D/644/2014), para. 8.7, and F.B. v. Netherlands, para. 8.7. See also CAT/C/BFA/CO/1, para. 21; CAT/C/GIN/CO/1, para. 17; and CAT/C/SLE/CO/1, para. 15. See the Committee’s general comment No. 4, para. 47. Ibid., para. 48.