CRPD/C/17/D/27/2015 requests are specifically intended for exceptional cases and to weigh up difficult considerations in deciding whether to fund treatment not available on the National Health Service. The State party further notes that the process is subject to appeal and judicial review. 4.7 The State party also argues that should the Committee find that the author’s claims are related to discrimination based on disability, rather than health care as it affects all State party citizens, then domestic remedies have not been exhausted, as the author has failed to file a claim under the State party’s Equality Act of 2010, which specifically prohibits discrimination by public bodies on the basis of disability, or under the Human Rights Act of 1998. 4.8 The State party further notes that, as to the author’s complaints to the General Medical Council, those proceedings were still pending at the time of the State party’s submission of its observations on the admissibility of the communication. Author’s comments on the State party’s submission 5.1 On 23 August 2015, the author submitted her comments on the State party’s observations. The author challenges the State party’s observation that her communication is manifestly ill-founded or not sufficiently substantiated. She maintains that she has provided reliable evidence that the State party has continuously violated her human rights and access to specialist medical care. She contests the State party’s argument that her condition is difficult to diagnose and treat, as her efforts to obtain a diagnosis have been successful when she has reached out to specialist consultants outside the State party. She further challenges the State party’s observation that she has received extensive treatment under the National Health Service and notes that despite undergoing two surgical procedures to repair the damage to the spinal cord membranes, she has not recovered neurologically and her health has continued to deteriorate. In addition, she claims that her post-surgical head and upper cervical spine symptoms have not been understood by consultants in the State party and that no further diagnostic testing or treatment was offered after conventional diagnostic testing failed and that she consequently has been abandoned and isolated in her illness while her health has continued to deteriorate. 5.2 Concerning the State party’s observation that it is not the Committee’s role to replace the domestic authorities in the assessment of the facts, the author asserts that she requires the Committee’s assistance, as the State party has violated her right to receive relevant information about her medical condition and has denied her legal redress and support. 5.3 The author maintains that she has exhausted all available domestic remedies. She argues that applying for funding by way of an individual patient funding request is not an effective remedy, as the panel would simply find that conditions for funding are not met. She notes that she is willing to make such an application if it is considered necessary in order to exhaust domestic remedies. However, she argues that even in the unlikely event that such an application were to be approved, it would still place an undue financial burden on her and her family as, in most circumstances, travel and accommodation costs are not reimbursed under this mechanism. Furthermore, she notes that the only time she has successfully used the individual patient funding request procedure, when she applied for funding in order to access private health-care in London, the process took 14 months of stifling bureaucracy before the request was approved and that, consequently, if she were required to submit another individual patient funding request application her waiting time for a definitive diagnosis and treatment would be further extended, exceeding an acceptable period of time. The author states that she did not consult health-care providers in the State party after November 2014, as when she was actively seeking specialist medical care there, the consultants she visited failed to identify and diagnose her post-surgical illness and prevent it from worsening and developing into multiple rare neurological diseases. The author asserts that she did not bring a claim under the 1998 Human Rights Act because, after seeking legal advice from an advocacy group, she was informed, on 22 August 2013, that there was no right to medical treatment under the Act. The author also notes that the General Medical Council reached a final decision on 21 May 2015 regarding her complaints against her treating consultants in the State party. The Council concluded that 8