CAT/C/CAN/CO/7 Diplomatic assurances 28. While taking note of the delegation’s statement that the State party rarely resorts to diplomatic assurances, and that when it does so the Canadian authorities have the option of establishing a post-return monitoring mechanism, the Committee regrets that the State party did not provide any examples of post-return monitoring arrangements between Canada and the receiving States. According to the information included in its periodic report, the State party has sought diplomatic assurances in 23 extradition cases since May 2012. In most of these cases, the assurances involved either protection against the death penalty or protection against prosecution for offences not covered by the surrender order. During the same period, the State party also sought assurances relevant to the specific treatment of the individual in 11 extradition cases. Lastly, the Committee notes that the State party has categorically rejected any implication that diplomatic guarantees run counter to article 3 of the Convention (art. 3). 29. The State party should under no circumstances expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. Moreover, as indicated in paragraph 20 of the Committee’s general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 in the context of article 22, diplomatic assurances should not be used as a loophole to undermine the principle of non-refoulement as set out in article 3 of the Convention. The State party should thoroughly consider the merits of each individual case, including the overall situation with regard to torture in the country of return. Transfer of detainees to Afghanistan 30. The Committee regrets not having received a clear response from the delegation on whether the Government is considering launching a full inquiry into the State party’s handling of the transfer of hundreds of detainees to the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces during its decade-long military mission in Afghanistan (arts. 3, 11 and 16). 31. Recalling the Committee’s previous recommendation (CAT/C/CAN/CO/6, para. 11), the State party should: (a) Launch a transparent and impartial investigation into the actions of Canadian officials relating to the transfer of Afghan detainees; (b) Adopt a policy for military operations that clearly prohibits prisoner transfers to another country when there are substantial grounds for believing that the individuals to be transferred would be in danger of being subjected to torture, and that clearly recognizes that diplomatic assurances and monitoring arrangements will not be relied upon to justify transfers when such substantial risk of torture exists. Canada – United States of America Safe Third Country Agreement 32. Regarding the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for cooperation in the examination of refugee status claims from nationals of third countries (the Safe Third Country Agreement), the Committee notes the delegation’s statement made during the dialogue that Canada believes that the United States remains a safe country for asylum claimants to seek and obtain protection when they meet the definition of a refugee. However, the Committee remains concerned at reports indicating a notable recent increase in the number of individuals in the United States wishing to seek asylum in Canada in an attempt to flee aggressive anti-immigration policies, and that because of the Safe Third Country Agreement most such individuals enter the State party at unofficial border crossings, often putting themselves at risk, since they would be turned back at official crossings (art. 3). 33. The State party should consider undertaking an assessment of the impact of the Safe Third Country Agreement on potential asylum seekers arriving from the United States who currently fear deportation and may have well-founded grounds, on the basis of their personal circumstances, to be considered for asylum. 7