CCPR/C/127/D/3070/2017 Annex Joint opinion of Committee members Christof Heyns, Photini Pazartzis and José Manuel Santos Pais (dissenting) 1. We respectfully disagree with the majority’s finding, in the present communication, of violations of articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. 2. The legal standards applicable to removal from a country are stated clearly and helpfully by the majority in paragraph 9.3. The question is whether the facts of the communication meet that standard. We think not. 3. Central to the finding of violations by the Committee is the fact that the Migration Court did not refer the case back to the Migration Board for oral evidence, on the basis of the claim by the author that he had become an atheist (paras. 9.4–9.7), even though he did not make that claim during the initial oral assessment. This is how we understand the background. 4. According to the author, he began to have doubts about Islam while on his way to Europe, and they grew after he arrived in Sweden in 2015. His case was heard by the Migration Board between 2015 and 2016. He had legal representation (public counsel) in the period leading up to the process (para. 4.7). The available oral and other evidence concerning the reasons why he would be at risk if deported were examined and found not to have been substantiated (para. 4.7 and footnote 5). His application for asylum was therefore rejected. At that point he did not raise his religious doubts, which had been years in the making, and therefore no oral evidence was heard about them. 5. Subsequently, several other processes took place. On 20 August 2017, the author applied for a temporary residence permit, claiming that his mental and physical health had deteriorated. He then introduced for the first time the claim that he had become an atheist. The Migration Board considered his case again. His new claims about his deteriorating health were investigated and rejected by the Migration Board, but oral evidence was not taken in respect of his claims with regard to religion. On appeal, the Migration Court considered the written evidence presented about his religious views but regarded the claims as too general and noted that even the letters of support that the author had submitted were based largely on his own accounts of his views. The Court questioned why he had not raised his growing doubts during the initial hearing, but only after the expulsion order had become final and non-appealable. It therefore held the author’s claim about his change of religion not to be sufficiently reliable to serve as a basis for granting a re-examination of his application (para. 2.9). 6. In our view, there does not appear to be a good reason to override those findings, reached by what appears to be a thoroughly conducted domestic process. 7. It should be noted that, in a particularly bizarre twist, as the author was waiting for the outcome of his final appeal, he wrote to the Embassy of Afghanistan to Sweden to announce that he had become an atheist – the very State that he claimed would persecute him for those views if they became apparent when he is returned (para. 2.11). The majority fails to confront that issue and merely states that such a letter “was sent” to the Embassy (para. 9.6). 8. The majority correctly states that, irrespective of whether he had been truthful about his reported conversion, the author should not be deported if he faced a real and personal risk of irreparable harm as contemplated by articles 6 and 7 if sent to his country of origin (para. 9.5). However, it is far from clear that such a risk exists. The sole source cited by the majority in support of the contention that the renunciation of the Muslim faith by the author may result in the death penalty being imposed on him in Afghanistan is a report of the Department of State of the United States of America, in which it is mentioned that, according to the Sunni Islam Hanafi school of jurisprudence, prevalent in parts of Afghanistan, conversion “to another religion” (atheism is not mentioned) is perceived as