CCPR/C/132/D/3266/2018 found to be vague and lacking in detail regarding his personal perception of and feelings related to his alleged sexual orientation. It also notes the Migration Court’s finding that the author’s claims were not considered credible, given that he invoked them more than two years after his arrival in Sweden, even though he had stated during the asylum proceedings that he had knowledge about the State party authorities’ view of homosexuality before arriving in Sweden. The Committee considers that the author’s allegations regarding the examination of his claims related to his sexual orientation mainly reflects his disagreement with the factual conclusions drawn by the State party’s authorities about the credibility of his claims. The Committee, however, notes that the domestic authorities considered all the claims raised by the author and it finds that the author has not demonstrated that the conclusions of the domestic authorities were clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice.8 6.8 Concerning the author’s claims that he would be at risk of persecution if returned to Afghanistan owing to his conversion, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence that regardless of the sincerity of the conversion, the test remains whether there are substantial grounds for believing that such a conversion may have serious adverse consequences in the country of origin such as to create a real risk of irreparable harm as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. Therefore, even when it is found that the reported conversion is not sincere, the authorities should proceed to assess whether, in the circumstances of the case, the behaviour and activities of the asylum seeker in connection with his or her conversion or convictions, could have serious adverse consequences in the country of origin so as to put him or her at risk of irreparable harm.9 6.9 In the present case, the Committee notes that the author claims that his allegation regarding his conversion was not adequately examined by the migration authorities. It notes the State party’s argument that the domestic authorities found the author’s account to be vague and lacking in reflection and his conversion not to be genuine. It further notes that the author has not provided any substantiation as to how his conversion would be known to Afghan authorities or others in his country of origin. The Committee considers the author’s claims about the risk to which he would be exposed in Afghanistan as a recent convert to be of a general and vague nature, and that his claim regarding the examination of his conversion mainly reflects his disagreement with the factual conclusions drawn by the State party’s authorities about the credibility of his claims. The Committee also considers that the State party’s authorities conducted an extensive asylum investigation with the author in this regard and the Migration Court held an oral hearing in order to examine the author’s faith and the motive for conversion. It considers accordingly that the author has not demonstrated that the conclusions of the domestic authorities were clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. 6.10 The Committee therefore concludes that the author has failed to substantiate, for purposes of admissibility, his claims under article 7 of the Covenant and declares the communication inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 7. The Committee therefore decides: (a) That the communication is inadmissible under articles 2 and 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol; (b) 8 9 That the decision shall be transmitted to the State party and to the author. See, for example, I.K. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/125/D/2373/2014), para. 9.7; M.P. et al. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/121/D/2643/2015), para. 8.7; and A.E. v. Sweden, para. 9.7. S.A.H. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/121/D/2419/2014), para. 11.8; Q.A. v. Sweden, para. 9.5; and J.I. v. Sweden (CCPR/C/128/D/3032/2017), para. 7.5. See also European Court of Human Rights, F.G. v. Sweden, Application No. 43611/11, Judgment, 23 March 2016, para. 156. 9