A/67/396 however infrequently such a power is exercised, and irrespective of whether its exercise was, or even could have been, at issue in any particular case. 61 35. It follows that, despite the significant improvements brought about by resolution 1989 (2011), the mandate of the Ombudsperson still does not meet the structural due process requirement of objective independence from the Committee. 62 The Special Rapporteur endorses the recommendation of the High Commissioner for Human Rights that the Security Council must now explore “every avenue of possibility” for establishing “an independent quasi-judicial procedure for review of listing and delisting decisions”. 63 This necessarily implies that the Ombudsperson’s comprehensive reports should be accepted as final by the Committee and that the decision-making powers of the Committee and Council should be removed. To reflect this modification, the Special Rapporteur invites the Security Council to consider renaming the Office of the Ombudsperson as the Office of the Independent Designations Adjudicator. 36. Security of tenure is an important additional guarantee of judicial independence. 64 Short terms of office that are periodically renewable by the executive are generally considered incompatible with the requisite appearance of independence. 65 While there is no indication that the present Ombudsperson has been in any way influenced by the requirement for her mandate to be renewed every 18 months, the test is once again an objective one. The Special Rapporteur accordingly recommends that the mandate of the Office of the Independent Designations Adjudicator/Ombudsperson be for a term of no less than three years. 37. The Special Rapporteur notes that requests for humanitarian exemptions under resolution 1989 (2011) must be put before the Committee by the individual’s State of citizenship or residence, and that they remain subject to the Committee’s consensus decision-making procedure. If the relevant State is unsympathetic, the request may never reach the Committee agenda. The Monitoring Team has suggested that individuals should be able to petition the Ombudsperson directly for humanitarian exemptions. The Special Rapporteur considers that such applications constitute the determination of a “civil right” under international human rights law, and accordingly recommends that they be brought within the mandate of the Office of the Independent Designations Adjudicator/Ombudsperson. 2. Procedural issues 38. The Ombudsperson has encountered considerable difficulties in obtaining information that States consider to be sensitive, for reasons of national security or otherwise. The Security Council, in its resolution 1989 (2011), urges States to provide the Ombudsperson with relevant confidential information where __________________ 61 62 63 64 65 12-52254 See European Court of Human Rights, Bryan v. United Kingdom (1995), 21 EHRR 342, para. 38. See R (Hany Youssef) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2012] EWHC 2091 (Admin), 23 July 2012, para. 50; see also Silver v. United Kingdom (1983), EHRR 347 (Ombudsperson lacking power to grant binding decision not an effective remedy). See A/HRC/16/50, paras. 27 and 44. CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 19. See European Court of Human Rights, Incal v. Turkey (2000), 29 EHRR 449; UKPC, Starrs and Chalmers v. Procurator Fiscal, 2000 SLT 42; UKHL, Millar v. Dickson [2002] 1WLR 1615. 15