A/67/396 53. In order to ensure that the interaction between the petitioner and the Office of the Independent Designations Adjudicator/Ombudsperson is effective, it needs to be conducted in a language the petitioner understands. This is a right recognized in most international human rights instruments.91 At present, the Office of the Ombudsperson does not have the facilities to ensure translation of documents or interpretation during interviews. 92 This needs to be urgently rectified. 54. The Ombudsperson has made it clear that it is not her function to consider whether the original listing was justified, but whether continued listing remains justified in current circumstances. This is governed by the standards set by the Security Council, including its interpretation of the term “associated with” Al-Qaida (see para. 24 above). The preamble to resolution 1989 (2011) states that sanctions measures are intended to be “preventative in nature and are not reliant upon criminal standards set out under national law”. 93 In defining her standard of review the Ombudsperson has sought to balance the essentially preventative nature of the regime against the significant detriments to which designated individuals and entities are subjected. 94 The test she applies is whether there is “sufficient information to provide a reasonable and credible basis for the continued listing”.94 The Ombudsperson looks for specificity and other indicia of reliability, 95 and will not attach significant weight to information that is vague, anonymous or otherwise unsourced, unless it is corroborated. Lack of detail and specificity “remains a serious problem”, according to the Ombudsperson.95 55. While the objective of the sanctions imposed under the 1267 regime may be preventative and deterrent, their impact on designated individuals and entities is comparable in nature to a penal sanction. 96 The distinction is not, in any event, entirely clear-cut. The Human Rights Committee has observed that certain measures must be regarded as penal, regardless of their formal classification, because of their “character or severity”, 97 and the European Court of Human Rights has observed that preventative and deterrent objectives “may be seen as constituent elements in the very notion of punishment”. 98 The sanctions under the Al-Qaida regime have rightly been characterized as “drastic and oppressive” and as “paralysing”. 99 The quasi-penal nature of the measures raises two fundamental questions: what standard of proof should be required for listing and delisting decisions, and whether sanctions under the regime should last indefinitely or be time-limited. 100 56. The Special Rapporteur agrees with the Ombudsperson that the standard for listing and delisting should be the same, and that a test of mere suspicion would set the threshold far too low. 101 He notes, however, that there is a range of familiar __________________ 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 20 See S/2012/590, paras. 54-56. See Security Council resolution 1989 (2011), fourteenth preambular paragraph. See http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/approach.shtml. See S/2012/590, para. 34. They have been described by the High Commissioner for Human Rights as “clearly punitive” (see A/HRC/16/50, para. 17) and by the former Special Rapporteur as a “criminal punishment” (see A/63/223, para. 16). CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 15. European Court of Human Rights, Welch v. United Kingdom, (1995) 20 EHRR 247, para. 30. Her Majesty’s Treasury (Respondent) v. Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (FC) (Appellants) [2010] UKSC 2, [2010] 2 AC 534, para. 6. Ibid., para. 58. See http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/approach.shtml. 12-52254