2 LAW-ENFORCEMENT EQUIPMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS Since 2009, through our research on issues relating to the documentation of law-enforcement equipment with National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) personnel, non-governmental organizations, and legal and medical experts from Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Chechen Republic, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as international monitoring bodies focusing on the region, we have found that there is often a lack of knowledge about the specific types of law-enforcement equipment deployed by law-enforcement and correctional services in Central Asia and more of a focus on the potential results of such deployment, such as unlawful arrest, excessive use of force, torture or other ill-treatment. By their very nature, law-enforcement devices are designed to restrain and/or inflict pain, however controlled or limited that pain may be. In order to strengthen oversight mechanisms governing the development, procurement, training and use of such devices—and thereby prevent the use of such equipment for the purposes of ill-treatment (either intentionally or through lack of proper training and oversight)—it is necessary to identify the equipment that is being used. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, police reform has been implemented by individual states in the Caucasus and Central Asia with varying degrees of success. Reforms have included the renaming of police and security forces in an attempt to make them appear less militaristic; the introduction of anticorruption programmes; the implementation of new training regimes; and attendance at training sessions hosted by external experts from individual countries or multilateral organizations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). These reforms have, in most instances, been sparked by significant public criticism of corruption and abusive practices. Russia, for example, embarked on a police reform programme in 2009, in part to increase efficiency, but also as an attempt to increase public trust in the effectiveness of the police services.5 In Armenia, the police response to protests following the 2008 election clashes in the capital, Yerevan—in which eight protestors and two police officers were killed, and which prompted widespread criticism of the use of ‘Russian-made tear gas’—resulted in the drafting and implementation of new guidelines for public-order management with the help of the OSCE.6 Heavy-handed police tactics resulting in injuries or loss of life attract international criticism and can lead to significant and unintended consequences for authorities, including popular protests and even uprisings. Such tactics have been used throughout the Central Eurasian region, particularly during events triggered by the break-up of the Soviet Union, in which police and interior ministry tactics resulted in loss of life and contributed to the emergence of independent states from the Baltic (e.g. 5 De Carbonnel, A., ‘Russian police brutality tests Medvedev reform’, Reuters, 14 June 2011. Stepanian, R., ‘New crowd control rules approved for Armenian police’, Armenia Liberty, 17 Feb. 2012, <http://www.armenialiberty.org/content/article/24487962.html>. The revised guidelines can be accessed on the website of the OSCE, <http://polis.osce.org/library/f/3986/3485/GOV-ARM-RPT-3986EN-3485>. 6