E/CN.4/1999/61/Add.1 page 14 for detainees falling within the scope of the State Security Courts, virtually conceding that the extension after two days is in practice always granted. More seriously, however, many officials simply did not know the regulations, referring to periods of detention of from 2 days to 10 days, some even referring to the previous 15 and 30 days of detention before being brought before a judge. Further, some officials insisted that even detainees falling within the scope of the State Security Courts had immediate access to a lawyer. If senior officials are not familiar with the current regulations, lower-level civil servants may obviously also be ignorant of the new standards. 48. Given that most observers report that torture normally takes place during the first two days, the up to four-day delay before a judge decides to release, remand or extend the custody period in cases involving three or more persons or falling within the scope of the State Security Court places the detainee at serious risk. Moreover, the law does not require the detainee to be brought before the judge when the extension of the custody period is decided upon. In Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that a delay of four days and six hours did not meet the European Court’s requirement for promptness. 1 It follows from this that any extension beyond four days without the suspect being brought personally before a judge is not in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. The fact that extensions of from 7 to 10 days may be granted in the emergency zone does not alter this situation. The European Court of Human Rights has taken the position that detentions of seven days under a state of emergency are only justifiable when other safeguards are in place, such as the remedy of habeas corpus and the right to consult with a lawyer after 48 hours. 2 In its General Comment 8 on article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Human Rights Committee expressed the view that the time limit for being brought “promptly” before a judge “must not exceed a few days”. 3 The Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers provide, in principle 7, that “Governments shall further ensure that all persons arrested or detained, with or without criminal charge, shall have prompt access to a lawyer, and in any case not later than 48 hours from the time of arrest or detention.” 49. Another problem is that the new Regulation provides that a prosecutor, at the request of the police, must authorize the extension of the detention beyond 48 hours. In practice the request for extension is rarely denied. It was instructive that virtually all interlocutors, both government officials and defence lawyers, referred to the four-day period. Further, several prosecutors admitted that the decision to extend the detention is based solely upon the report filed to the prosecutor requesting the extension. One chief public prosecutor of a State Security Court pointed out that the case file remains with the Anti-Terror Branch, and thus, it is difficult for him to make a decision. He also said that the police requests for extensions often come just before the expiry of the 48-hour period. Accordingly, he must trust the Anti-Terror Branch. Similarly, another chief public prosecutor of a State Security Court admitted that denials of police requests for extension were infrequent and indicated that the police carried out the investigation on behalf of the prosecutor. He stated that, therefore, there must be an element of trust between the two.