complicity in the torture of Spanish citizens, the CAT expressed the view that Article 5 §2 of the Convention “conferred on States Parties universal jurisdiction over torturers present in their territory, whether former heads of State or not, in cases where it was unable or unwilling to extradite them…”.133 Developments in other areas of international criminal law seem to suggest a trend towards establishing jurisdiction over international crimes, even when they are alleged to have been committed by the highest officials and heads of States. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court134, the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia135, and the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda136 all extend their jurisdiction to the highest officials and heads of States. The UN International Law Commission has expressed the view that the rule that heads of States and public officials may be held criminally responsible when they commit crimes under international law is an essential part of the international legal system.137 II. INDIVIDUAL ANALYSIS OF ARTICLES 1–16 OF THE CONVENTION 2. ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS Immunity from jurisdiction: The Yerodia Case 40 Despite these recent trends in international criminal law, a judgment by the International Court of Justice in February 2002 upheld the immunity from jurisdiction of an incumbent minister of foreign affairs for alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes. The majority of the Court observed that in international law it is firmly established that, similarly to diplomatic and consular agents, certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the head of State, head of government and minister of foreign affairs, enjoy immunity from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal.138 No exception to this position on the basis of the nature of the alleged crimes as being serious international crimes was found by the Court. The Court went on to note that although various international conventions on the prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes impose on States obligations of prosecution or extradition, thereby requiring them to extend their criminal prosecution, such extension of jurisdiction in no way affects immunities under customary international law. These remain opposable before the courts of a foreign State, even where those courts exercise such jurisdiction under these conventions.139 In other words, the absolute nature of the obligation to establish jurisdiction over the crime of torture in Article 5 §2 —which is meant to apply irrespective of the status of the alleged offender— is superseded by jurisdictional immunities in customary international law enjoyed by certain representatives of States. Having outlined such a robust notion of immunity, the Court noted that jurisdictional immunity under international law in certain circumstances does not represent a bar to criminal prosecution. The Court referred to the following circumstances: