A/63/175 disabilities, and primarily upon persons with mental or intellectual disabilities, warrants greater attention. 63. Inside institutions, as well as in the context of forced outpatient treatment, psychiatric medication, including neuroleptics and other mind-altering drugs, may be administered to persons with mental disabilities without their free and informed consent or against their will, under coercion, or as a form of punishment. The administration in detention and psychiatric institutions of drugs, including neuroleptics that cause trembling, shivering and contractions and make the subject apathetic and dull his or her intelligence, has been recognized as a form of torture. 35 In Viana Acosta v. Uruguay, the Human Rights Committee concluded that the treatment of the complainant, which included psychiatric experiments and forced injection of tranquillizers against his will, constituted inhuman treatment. 36 The Special Rapporteur notes that forced and non-consensual administration of psychiatric drugs, and in particular of neuroleptics, for the treatment of a mental condition needs to be closely scrutinized. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the suffering inflicted and the effects upon the individual’s health may constitute a form of torture or ill-treatment. d. Involuntary commitment to psychiatric institutions 64. Many States, with or without a legal basis, allow for the detention of persons with mental disabilities in institutions without their free and informed consent, on the basis of the existence of a diagnosed mental disability often together with additional criteria such as being a “danger to oneself and others” or in “need of treatment”. 37 The Special Rapporteur recalls that article 14 of CRPD prohibits unlawful or arbitrary deprivation of liberty and the existence of a disability as a justification for deprivation of liberty. 38 65. In certain cases, arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of liberty based on the existence of a disability might also inflict severe pain or suffering on the individual, thus falling under the scope of the Convention against Torture. When assessing the pain inflicted by deprivation of liberty, the length of institutionalization, the conditions of detention and the treatment inflicted must be taken into account. __________________ 35 36 37 38 16 E/CN.4/1986/15, para. 119. Human Rights Committee, views on communication No. 110/1981, Viana Acosta v. Uruguay, adopted on 29 March 1984 (CCPR/C/21/D/110/1981), paras. 2.7, 14 and 15. See HRI/GEN/1/Rev.8, sect. II, Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 8 (1982) on the right to liberty and security of the person, para. 1, where the Committee clarifies that article 9 applies “whether in criminal cases or in other cases such as, for example, mental illness …”. See also the report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (E/CN.4/2005/6), para. 58. See further the discussion by the European Court of Human Rights in Shtukaturov v. Russia, application No. 44009/05, judgement of 27 March 2008. During the convention-making process, some States (Canada, Uganda, Australia, China, New Zealand, South Africa and the European Union) supported deprivation of liberty based on disability being permitted when coupled with other grounds. Finally, at the seventh session of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Japan, with the support of China, sought to amend the text of article 14 to read “in no case shall the existence of a disability ‘solely or exclusively’ justify a deprivation of liberty”. However, the proposal was rejected. See daily summary of discussion at the seventh session, on 18 and 19 January 2006, available at www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7summary.htm. 08-44075