CAT/C/62/D/496/2012 successful. The Burundian authorities have taken few measures to compensate victims of torture, a point raised by the Committee in its concluding observations following its consideration of the State party’s report in 2006 (see CAT/C/BDI/CO/1, para. 23). The complainant adds that he is still affected by the physical consequences of the beating he received — he is unable to lift heavy objects or work in the fields — and that he has never benefited from any form of rehabilitation designed to ensure that he recovers as fully as possible in physical, psychological, social and financial terms. He also notes that, in its concluding observations, the Committee also expressed concern about the failure to provide victims of torture with the means to exercise this right. Furthermore, the complainant recalls that the State party’s obligation to guarantee the provision of redress includes compensation for damages and the adoption of measures to prevent the acts from occurring again, a step that would involve, first of all, opening an investigation and prosecuting the perpetrators. 13 The crime committed against the complainant remains unpunished, a situation that is a violation of his right to redress under article 14 of the Convention. 3.7 The complainant states again that the violence inflicted on him was torture, in accordance with the definition set out in article 1 of the Convention. In the alternative, he maintains that, even if the Committee does not regard that violence as torture, the abuse he endured was cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and that the State party also has an obligation, under article 16 of the Convention, to prevent public officials from committing, instigating or tolerating such acts and to provide redress for the damage caused. State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits 4.1 On 21 March 2012, the State party was requested to submit its observations on the admissibility and merits of the communication. Reminders were sent on 9 November 2012, 5 March 2013, 12 August 2013, 7 February 2014 and 10 February 2015. On 4 June 2015, the State party submitted its observations on the admissibility and merits of the communication. It notes that the complainant has not exhausted all available domestic remedies, as required under article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention. According to the State party, the complainant rushed to submit his case to the Committee, without waiting for the Burundian courts to respond to his complaint. The State party submits that the proceedings that had begun were still far from having taken an unreasonably long time. Furthermore, for the complainant to say that it would have been dangerous for him to attempt other proceedings was “baseless”. 4.2 The State party also contests the complainant’s assertion that the remedies he could seek were ineffective, of no use and unavailable by noting that the investigation of his case had proceeded to the point that the public prosecutor had already arranged a hearing to cross-examine the parties, which was likely to have been followed by many others before the case was referred to the competent court or dismissed. The State party submits that the prosecutor’s efforts were thwarted by the inertia of the complainant, who at one point stopped taking an active interest in the progress of his case. The complainant is therefore wrong to submit that he was obstructed by the inaction of the judicial authorities, who, for the case to move forward, are simply waiting for the complainant. The complainant, according to the State party, sabotaged the investigations by denigrating the Burundian judicial authorities, who are making noble efforts to ensure the proper administration of justice. In addition, it would not have been dangerous for the complainant to initiate other procedures, as the two antagonists see each other every day, and the complainant, as many witnesses could confirm, has not been threatened. 4.3 The State party is of the view that it is not in a position to submit observations on the merits of the case, let alone to comment on a case that is already before the courts. It submits that Mr. Barutwanayo, former governor of Cibitoke Province, is an ordinary citizen who no longer holds a government position and can therefore be brought before the domestic courts; neither does he enjoy any immunity from prosecution. The State party, 13 6 The complainant refers to Guridi v. Spain (CAT/C/34/D/212/2002), para. 6.8. He adds that these views are in line with the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee (Bautista v. Colombia, para. 8.2; and Coronel et al. v. Colombia, CCPR/C/76/D/778/1997, para. 6.2). GE.18-00818