CEDAW/C/69/D/80/2015 may intersect with other proscribed grounds of discrimination, including age, race, ethnicity/nationality, religion, health, class, caste, being lesbian, bisexual or transgender and other status” (para. 16). The Committee further refers to its general recommendation No. 19 (1992) on violence against women, in which it recalls that “gender-based violence, which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law o r under human rights conventions, is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention”, and that such rights include the right to life and the right not to be subject to torture (para. 7). The Committee has further elaborated its interpreta tion of violence against women as a form of gender discrimination in its general recommendation No. 35 (2017) on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19, in which it reaffirms the obligation of States parties to eliminate discrimination against women, including gender-based violence, resulting from the acts or omissions of the State party or its actors, on the one hand, and non-State actors, on the other (para. 21). 8.6 In the case at hand, the Committee observes that there is no claim that the State party has directly violated the provisions of the Convention, but rather that the violation would occur if the State party returned the author to Uganda, thereby exposing her to the risk of serious forms of gender-based violence at the hands of the police or of private individuals hostile to gay people. 8.7 The Committee takes note of the State party’s argument that the author’s allegations were thoroughly examined by the Danish Immigration Service and Refugee Appeals Board, which dismissed them in their entirety because of a negative credibility finding that vitiated her claim (see paras. 4.9–4.12). The Committee recalls that it is generally for the authorities of States parties to the Convention to evaluate the facts and evidence or the application of national law in a particular case, 10 unless it can be established that the evaluation was biased or based on gender stereotypes that constitute discrimination against women, was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. 11 In that regard, the Committee notes that, in substance, the author is challenging the manner in which the State party’s authorities assessed the factual circumstances of her case, applied the provisions of legislation and reached conclusions. The issue before the Committee is, therefore, whether there was any irregularity in the decision-making process regarding the author’s asylum application, to the extent that the State party’s authorities failed to properly assess the risk of serious gender-based violence in the event of her return to Uganda. 8.8 The Committee notes that the State party’s authorities found that the author’s account lacked credibility owing to a number of factual inconsistencies and a lack of substantiation, in particular with regard to her claim to be a lesbian and her account of the incident that allegedly occurred in 2011 in a bar in Katwe. The Committee further notes that, notwithstanding the credibility findings with respect to the author described above, the State party also considered the human rights situation in Uganda and, in particular, the situation of gay people in Uganda. The State party maintains that, although homosexuality is prohibited under the Penal Code, the prohibition has not been enforced and no one has been convicted of homosexuality. Available evidence referred to by the State party further indicates that there is no routine or systematic targeting of gay people. The Committee further notes that, on 1 August 2014, the Constitutional Court of Uganda struck down the Anti-Homosexuality Act. 8.9 In the light of the foregoing, and while not underestimating the concerns that may legitimately be expressed with regard to gender-based discrimination in Uganda, __________________ 10 11 10/11 See, for example, S.J.A. v. Denmark (CEDAW/C/68/D/79/2014), paras. 7.9–7.10. See, for example, N.Q. v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (CEDAW/C/63/D/62/2013). 18-06594