Advance unedited version CCPR/C/132/D/2361/2014 allegations, for purposes of admissibility. Accordingly, it declares this part of the communication inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 6.5 The Committee considers that the author’s remaining claims, raising issues under articles 7, 9(1), 14(1) and 19 of the Covenant, have been sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility and proceeds to their examination on the merits. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the case in the light of all the information submitted to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 7.2 The Committee notes the author’s claims that his involuntary hospitalization and detention in a psychiatric hospital violated his rights under article 9(1) of the Covenant. 7.3 The Committee recalls that commitment to and treatment in a psychiatric institution against the will of a patient constitutes a form of deprivation of liberty that falls under the terms of article 9 of the Covenant.13 It further recalls that article 9(1) requires that deprivation of liberty must not be arbitrary and must be carried out with respect for the rule of law. The second sentence of paragraph 1 prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, while the third sentence prohibits unlawful deprivation of liberty, that is, deprivation of liberty that is not imposed on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. The two prohibitions overlap, in that arrests and detentions may be both arbitrary and unlawful.14 Furthermore, it recalls that the notion of arbitrariness is not to be equated with “against the law” but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law. 15 7.4 While acknowledging that States may deem an individual’s mental health to be impaired to such an extent that, in order to avoid harm to the individual or others, the issuance of a committal order is unavoidable, 16 the Committee considers that involuntary hospitalization can only be applied, if at all, as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time, and must be accompanied by adequate procedural and substantive safeguards established by law.17 The procedures should ensure respect for the views of the individual and should ensure that any representative genuinely represents and defends the wishes and interests of the individual. 18 7.5 The Committee notes that in the present case, the author or his lawyers were neither informed about time and location nor able to be present during the trial hearings or appeal procedures, that during the proceedings against him he was not allowed to be examined by other medical professionals and that the order of involuntary confinement was unlimited in time and not subject to periodic review. In the absence of any information from the State party, and based on the review of the submissions by the author, the Committee considers that his rights under article 9 were violated.19 7.6 As regards the author’s claim under article 7, the Committee has to evaluate whether the involuntary hospitalization amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. The Committee observes that, while involuntary hospitalization may be applied as a measure of last resort and, at times, may be justified to protect the life and health of individuals, illegal and arbitrary committal to a hospital may cause mental and physical suffering and thus amount to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, within the meaning of article 7 of the Covenant. 7.7 The Committee notes the author’s submission that his committal to psychiatric clinic was the result of his outspoken criticism of the regional authorities in charge of medical 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 See, for example, A. v. New Zealand (CCPR/C/66/D/754/1997), para. 7.2; and Fijalkowska v. Poland (CCPR/C/84/D/1061/2002), para. 8.2. See the Committee’s general comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person, paras. 10–11. Ibid., para. 12. See also, for example, M.G.C. v. Australia (CCPR/C/113/D/1875/2009), para. 11.5. See Fijalkowska v. Poland, para. 8.3. See general comment No. 35, para. 19. See also Fijalkowska v. Poland, para. 8.3. See general comment No. 35, para. 19; and CCPR/C/CZE/CO/2, para. 14. See Mukhortova v. Kazakhstan, (CCPR/C/127/D/2920/2016), para. 7.14. 5