married person remain. The State party states that the Civil Code imposes additional obligations upon married persons, which the author and her partner have not taken upon themselves; it mentions, inter alia, the imposition of a maintenance allowance payable to the former spouse. The State party argues that nothing prevented the author from entering into the legal status of marriage, subsequent to which she would have been entitled to all corresponding benefits. which it had been held that, in the circumstances of the case, a difference of treatment between married and unmarried couples did not constitute discrimination within the meaning of article 26 of the Covenant. 2.5 The author states that the Health Insurance Act has been amended and that it recognizes the equality of common law and official marriages as of 1 January 1988. The complaint 5.3 The State party submits that it has at no time taken any general decision to abolish the distinction between married persons and cohabitants, and that it has introduced equal treatment only in certain specific situations and on certain conditions. It further submits that each social security law was reviewed separately with regard to the introduction of equal treatment between married persons and cohabitants; this explains why in some laws equal treatment was incorporated sooner than in others. 3. The author claims that she is a victim of a violation by the State party of article 36 of the Covenant, because she was denied co-insurance under the Health Insurance Act, which distinguished between married and unmarried couples, whereas other social security legislation already recognized the equality of status between common law and official marriages. Committee’s admissibility decision 6.1 In her reply to the State party’s submission, the author submits that the differences between married and unmarried couples should be seen in the context of family law; they do not affect the socio-economic circumstances, which are similar to both married and unmarried couples. 4.1 At its forty-first session, the Committee considered the admissibility of the communication. It noted that the State party had not raised any objection to the admissibility of the communication and it ascertained that the same matter was not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 6.2 The author further submits that the legal status of married couples and cohabitants, who confirmed certain mutual obligations by notarial contract, was found to be equivalent by the courts before. She refers in this context to a decision of the Central Board of Appeal, on 23 November 1986, concerning emoluments to married military personnel. She further contends that, as of 1 January 1987, equal treatment was accepted in almost all Dutch social security legislation, except for the Health Insurance Act and the General Widows and Orphans Act. 4.2 On 22 March 1991, the Committee declared the communication admissible in respect of article 26 of the Covenant. State party’s submission on merits and the author’s comments thereon 5.1 In its submission, dated 15 November 1991, the State party argues that the differentiation between married and unmarried persons in the Health Insurance Act does not constitute discrimination within the meaning of article 26 of the Covenant. In this context, it refers to the Committee’s views in communication No. 180/1984. Consideration on the merits 7.1 The Human Rights Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided in article 5, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol. 5.2 The State party contends that, although the author has entered into certain mutual obligations by notarial contract, considerable differences between her status and that of a 7.2 The Committee observes that, although a State is not required under the Covenant to adopt social security legislation, if it does, such annex VIII, sect. C, Views adopted on 9 April 1987 at the twenty-ninth session. 114