refused, the applicant cannot say [that] he has no remedy . . .”. The Committee’s admissibility considerations and decision 6.2 The State party criticizes the Committee’s interpretation of article 5, paragraph 2(b), of the Optional Protocol, according to which a domestic remedy must be both available and effective as “a gloss on the relevant provisions of the Optional Protocol”: in the instant case, the effectiveness of the remedy must in any event be demonstrated by the power of the Judicial Committee to entertain an appeal. 5.1 During its 34th session, the Committee considered the admissibility of the communication. With regard to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, it found that, in the circumstances, a petition for special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council did not constitute an available and effective remedy within the meaning of the Optional Protocol. Furthermore, it emphasized that unreasonably prolonged delays had been encountered in obtaining the written judgment of the Court of Appeal of Jamaica, the submission of which to the Judicial Committee was a prerequisite for an application for leave to appeal to be entertained. In “Mr. Collins” case, it was undisputed that he had not received the written judgment of the Court of Appeal approximately two years after the dismissal of his appeal. 6.3 The State party affirms that even if the Judicial Committee were to dismiss the author’s petition for special leave to appeal, the communication would remain inadmissible, on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, since Mr. Collins would retain the right to apply for constitutional redress in the Supreme (Constitutional) Court, alleging a violation of his right to a fair trial, protected by section 20 of the Constitution. 5.2 On 2 November 1988, accordingly, the Human Rights Committee declared the communication admissible. 6.4 Considering that further information about the constitutional remedy which the State party claims remains open to Mr. Collins would assist it in the consideration of the communication, the Committee adopted an interlocutory decision during its thirty-seventh session, on 2 November 1989. In it, the State party was requested to clarify whether the Supreme (Constitutional) Court had had the opportunity to determine, pursuant to section 25, paragraph 2, of the Jamaican Constitution, whether an appeal to the Court of Appeal and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council constituted “adequate means of redress” for individuals who claim that their right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by section 20, paragraph 1, of the Constitution, had been violated. Should the answer be in the affirmative, the State party was asked to also clarify whether the Supreme (Constitutional) Court had declined to exercise its powers under section 25, paragraph 2, in respect of such applications, on the ground that adequate means of redress were already provided for in law. By submission of 22 February 1990, the State party replied that the Supreme (Constitutional) Court had not had the opportunity to consider the issue. It reiterated its request of 25 May 1989 that the decision on admissibility be revised, citing rule 93, paragraph b, of the Committee’s rules of procedure. The State party’s objections to the admissibility decision and the Committee’s requests for further clarifications 6.1 By two submissions of 25 May 1989 and 22 February 1990, the State party rejects the Committee’s findings of admissibility and challenges the reasoning described in paragraph 5.1 above. In particular, it submits that the fact that the power of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to grant special leave to appeal pursuant to section 110, paragraph 3, of the Constitution, is discretionary, does not relieve Mr. Collins from his obligation to pursue this remedy. It contends that: “[a] remedy is no less a remedy because there is, inherent in structure, a preliminary stage which must be undergone before the remedy itself becomes properly applicable. In the instant case, an application to the Privy Council for special leave [to appeal] from decisions of the Court of Appeal is considered in a judicial hearing and a determination thereon is made on grounds which are wholly judicial and reasonable. The Privy Council refuses to grant leave to appeal if it considers that there is no merit in the appeal. Therefore, where special leave was 6.5 In June 1991, author’s counsel informed the Committee that the Supreme (Constitutional) Court had rendered its judgement in the cases of 56