under Bill C-31. Thus, the children of P. E. and V. E. will be ineligible to become Band members, since P. E and V. E. married non-Indians: counsel adds that it is unlikely that any of the future children of other registered Band members will be eligible. This situation, it is submitted, does not involve hypothetical and future violations of the Covenant: some of the Band’s children will grow up in the knowledge that they can only protect their cultural heritage if they marry an Indian registered under Bill C-31. The Bill is thus said to constitute an infringement on the right to marry even in circumstances where no individualized child has as of yet been disenfranchised. reasonable under the circumstances. They also claim irreparable harm as pendente lite there would be no protection for children not registered as Indians or as members of the Band. Finally, the authors reiterate that a constitutional challenge could take at least 4 l/2 years, a period the Committee has deemed unreasonably prolonged within the meaning of article 5, paragraph 2(b), of the Optional Protocol on previous occasions.6 5.4 The authors further contend that they have been offered neither financial nor legal assistance. Funding remains entirely at the discretion of the Minister for Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and none of the government’s comments suggest that legal assistance would be forthcoming if the current complaint were to be dismissed. The issues Committee and proceedings before the 6.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of procedure, decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 5.5 In respect of revising and re-submitting their Band by-laws to the competent Minister, the authors underline that by-laws cannot override the provisions of Bill C-31, including the racial standards they have challenged. The Minister cannot approve by-laws which conflict with statutory norms. 6.2 With respect to the authors claim of a violation of article 1 of the Covenant, the Committee recalls its constant jurisprudence that pursuant to article 1 of the Optional Protocol, it may receive and consider communications only if they emanate from individuals who claim that their individual rights have been violated by a State party to the Optional Protocol. While all peoples have the right to self-determinations and the right freely to determine their political status, pursue their economic, social and cultural development (and may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources) the Committee has already decided that no claim for self- determination may be brought under the Optional Protocol.7 Thus, this aspect of the communication is inadmissible under article 1 of the Optional Protocol. 5.6 In another submission, dated 3 October 1990, the authors explain that they have not applied for financial assistance from the Department of Justice, since they were advised that there is little hope of success and that this assistance is ordinarily available only for appeals, rather than for the preparation for trial and initial complaints. In addition, the authors have ascertained that in other domestic litigation concerning rights of indigenous peoples, no judicial decisions have been handed down. In particular, the Twinn case is not expected to go to trial before 1991. 5.7 Author’s counsel indicates that there are presently six adults in the Whispering Pines Band with so-called “6(2)” status under Bill C-31 -i.e. adults who, if marrying a non-status Indian, cannot pass on Indian status to their children. None of these children can be registered under Bill C-31. The consequences for the others depend on whom they will marry; in view of the small size of the Band, counsel notes that it is unlikely that they will marry anyone with status 6.3 With regard to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Committee has noted the authors’ arguments that they have unsuccessfully endeavoured to challenge 7 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortyfifth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/45/40), vol. II, annex IX, sect. A, communication No. 167/1984, Views adopted on 26 March 1990, para. 32.1; and ibid., Forty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/46/40), annex XII, sect. O, communication No. 413/1990, decision of 2 November 1990, para. 3.2. 6 Weinberger Weisz v. Uruguay (communication No. 28/1978, in Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee, United Nations publication (Sales No. E.89.XIV.1), vol. I, pp. 57 et seq. 21