CEDAW/C/72/D/96/2015 a supporter of the rebels”, given that she treated her cousin, a Chechen rebel, for an injury allegedly received during a conflict with the Chechen authorities. 5.5 The author submits that the above information confirms the information she provided to Danish authorities in her asylum request, proving her credibility. She observes that it is difficult to provide evidence, owing to the risk of abuse by both the Chechen authorities and her family. She recalls that the State party cannot return an asylum seeker to his or her country of origin if there is an imminent danger that he or she will be subject to abuse. She refers to the case of A v. Denmark, 17 in which the Committee noted that States parties should take into account that the threshold for accepting asylum applications should be measured not against the probability, but against the reasonable likelihood that the claimant has a well -founded fear of persecution or that she would be exposed to persecution upon her return. She highlights that she had been subjected to rape and cruel and inhumane treatm ent, amounting to torture. The author refers to the decision of the Committee against Torture in Rong v. Australia,18 in which it noted that complete accuracy was seldom to be expected by victims of torture. She also refers to an individual opinion of the Human Rights Committee in P.T. v. Denmark, 19 according to which, as a general approach to interpreting the matters submitted to it, that Committee must decide for the option most favourable to the alleged victim in case of doubt. 5.6 Furthermore, the author rejects the State party’s submission that the Refugee Appeals Board considered the Convention in its decision of 31 August 2015. She refers to M.N.N. v. Denmark 20 and A v. Denmark, in which the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women held that a State party would violate the Convention if it returned a person to another State where it was foreseeable that serious gender-based violence would occur. The author recalls that her mother has informed her that her brother intends to commit an honour killing. State party’s observations on the merits 6.1 By a note verbale dated 22 December 2016, 21 the State party submitted its observations on the merits of the communication. The State party reiterates that the communication should be considered inadmissible under article 4 (2) (c) of the Optional Protocol, because it is manifestly ill-founded and the author has failed to establish a prima facie case for the purpose of admissibility. Should the Committee find the communication to be admissible, the State party submits that the author has not sufficiently established that she would be exposed to a rea l, personal and foreseeable risk of serious forms of gender-based violence if she were to be returned to the Russian Federation. 6.2 The State party recalls the author’s submissions dated 17 September 2015 and 22 January 2016. It observes that they seem to provide no new and specific information on her situation in addition to the information on the basis of which the Refugee Appeals Board denied her asylum claim, and it therefore refers to its observations dated 15 November 2015. The State party reiterates that the Board thoroughly examined the author’s claims in the context of her background and found them to be inconsistent and “non-credible”. __________________ 17 18 19 20 21 6/11 A v. Denmark (CEDAW/C/62/D/53/2013), para. 9.3. Rong v. Australia (CAT/C/49/D/416/2010), para. 7.5. P.T. v. Denmark, appendix II, para. 3, individual opinion of Human Rights Committee member Fabián Salvioli. M.N.N. v. Denmark (CEDAW/C/55/D/33/2011). On 12 July 2016, the Committee decided to maintain its request for interim measures and examine the admissibility of the communication together with its merits. 19-05867