CAT/C/53/D/458/2011 8.3 The State party submits that the complaint is inadmissible as manifestly unfounded. The Committee considers, however, that the arguments put forward by the complainant raise substantive issues, which should be dealt with on the merits. Accordingly, the Committee finds no obstacles to the admissibility and declares the communication admissible. Consideration of the merits 9.1 In accordance with article 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention, the Committee has considered the present complaint in the light of all information made available to it by the parties concerned. 9.2 The issue before the Committee is whether the expulsion of the complainant to Ethiopia would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (refouler) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that she would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to Ethiopia. In assessing this risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3, paragraph 2, of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the existence of a pattern of such violations does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at a risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subject to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 10 9.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention, in which it states that the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion.11 Although the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable, the Committee recalls that the burden of proof normally falls upon the complainant, who must present an arguable case establishing that he or she runs a “foreseeable, real and personal” risk. 12 The Committee recalls that, under the terms of its general comment No.1, it gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned, while at the same time it is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, provided by article 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in every case. 9.4 In the present case, the Committee notes that the complainant claims before the Committee to have been imprisoned and tortured on several occasions in connection with her father’s and her own political activity in the Oromo Liberation Front and alleges to be at a risk of new arrests and torture if returned to Ethiopia. The Committee also notes the State party’s submission that the complainant’s original claim to the State authorities was based on the fear of persecution for her Oromo origin, that allegations of her detention about four years before coming to Denmark were added at a later stage of asylum 10 11 12 10 See communications No. 426/2010, R.D. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 8 November 2013, para. 9.2; No. 344/2008, A.M.A. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 12 November 2010, para. 7.2; Communication No. 333/2007, decision adopted on 15 November 2010, para. 7.3. A/53/44, annex IX. See, for example, communications No. 414/2010, N.T.W. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 16 May 2012, para. 7.3; and No. 343/2008, Arthur Kasombola Kalonzo v. Canada, decision adopted on 18 May 2012, para. 9.3.