CAT/C/59/D/634/2014 4.12 The Refugee Appeals Board thus found that the first complainant had failed to substantiate that he had been detained and subjected to torture. As emphasized in the reasoning of its decision, the Board considered whether the reason for the inconsistencies described above and the other inconsistencies in the first complainant’s statements on the case could be that he had been subjected to torture; however, the Board found that that could not be the case. It is observed in this respect that the inconsistencies concerned one isolated incident that took place shortly before the complainants’ departure in early January 2014. Accordingly, on the basis of its credibility assessment, the Board also could not accept as fact that the authorities had gone to the complainants’ home after their departure. In this context, the State party refers to the view expressed by the European Court of Human Rights on several occasions: “It [the Court] accepts that, as a general principle, the national authorities are best placed to assess not just the facts but, more particularly, the credibility of witnesses since it is they who have had an opportunity to see, hear and assess the demeanour of the individual concerned.”12 4.13 As to the complainants’ argument that, in its credibility assessment, the Refugee Appeals Board did not take into account that persons who have been subjected to torture have difficulties in giving an account of facts, the State party submits that the case of Ke Chun Rong v. Australia referred to by the complainants differs considerably from the present case. Both the first and the second complainants were interviewed several times by the Danish Immigration Service and made oral statements in person before the Refugee Appeals Board, and were therefore allowed the opportunity to account for any inconsistencies. Upon an overall assessment of the information provided by the first complainant in support of his asylum application and the other details stated in the case, including the information provided by the second complainant, the Board could not find the first complainant’s statements on his conflicts in the Russian Federation prior to his departure to be factual. The State party observes in this respect that no information is given in the complaint to the Committee that could result in a different assessment of the credibility of the first complainant’s information on his grounds for seeking asylum. 4.14 The State party further submits that the letters from the complainants’ neighbours submitted to the Committee (see para. 2.3) cannot lead to a different assessment of their credibility. The State party finds it peculiar that the first complainant produced these letters only when the complaint was brought before the Committee and not at the hearing before the Refugee Appeals Board about a month earlier. It is further observed that, during the asylum proceedings, the first complainant stated that, after his entry into Denmark, he had been in contact with one of his sisters and that they had discussed his conflicts in the Russian Federation, including the three occasions on which the authorities had gone to the complainants’ house after they had left the country. The complainants, however, have given no detailed reason why the letters could not have been produced earlier, nor described the circumstances of the emergence of the letters. The State party therefore finds that the letters appear to be pleadings in support of the complainants’ case and cannot be given any independent evidential value. 4.15 Accordingly, the State party considers that the complainants will not risk persecution or abuse justifying asylum in Denmark upon their return to the Russian Federation and that their return will not constitute a violation of article 3 of Convention. 12 8 Application No. 41827/07, R.C. v. Sweden, judgment of 9 March 2010, para. 52. In application No. 71398/12, M.E. v. Sweden, judgment of 26 June 2014, the Court mentions “the credibility of the applicant”.