Chapter v  Right to be Presumed Innocent and Privilege against Self-Incrimination 101 evidence.409 This is referred to as “use immunity” (meaning that the evidence is immune from being used against the person who is compelled to break her/his right to silence). In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights has clarified that the right not to incriminate oneself cannot reasonably be confined to directly incriminating remarks. What is crucial is the use to which evidence obtained under compulsion is put in the course of the criminal trial.410 In Saunders v the United Kingdom, the fact that the compulsorily obtained statements were read to the jury over a period of three days confirmed the considerable reliance from the prosecutorial side on the statements, hence prompting the European Court to conclude that they were used in a manner which sought to incriminate the defendant.411 In the same case, the European Court excluded that the “public interest” could be invoked to allow the use of statements compulsorily obtained in a non-judicial investigation to incriminate a defendant in a criminal trial.412 A failure to answer questions the law requires to be answered may amount to an offence of non-cooperation with the authorities. In López v Spain, for example, a request was made of the applicant in that case on the basis of article 72(3) of the Road Safety Act, which provided that: “The owner of the vehicle, on being duly asked to do so, has the duty to identify the driver responsible for the offence; if he fails to fulfil this obligation promptly without justified cause, he shall be liable to a fine for having committed a serious misdemeanour.” Pursuant to this request, Mr. López sent the traffic authorities a letter, in which he stated that he was not the driver of the vehicle and did not know who had been driving it since he had lent it to several people during that period. He was fined 50,000 pesetas. The applicant claimed that his rights to the presumption of innocence and the right not to testify against himself were violated, since he had to identify the driver of the vehicle. The Human Rights Committee concluded that Mr. López had been punished for non-cooperation with the authorities and not for a traffic offence. It took the view that a penalty for failure to cooperate with the authorities fell outside the scope of application of article 14(2) and (3)(g) of the ICCPR.413 5.2.4 Adverse inference drawn from silence Like the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to silence lies at the heart of the notion of a fair trial, and particular caution is required, therefore, before a domestic court adversely refers to an accused’s silence.414 For the right to silence to be effective, it is impermissible to base the conviction of an accused solely or mainly on the accused’s silence or on her/his refusal to answer questions or give evidence during the trial.415 On the other hand, an accused’s decision to remain silent throughout criminal proceedings may have implica- 409 Saunders v the United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 65, paras 71–76. 410 Saunders v the United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 65, para 71. 411 Saunders v the United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 65, para 72. 412 Saunders v the United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 65, para 74. 413 López v Spain, HRC Communication 777/1997, UN Doc CCPR/C/67/D/777/1997 (1999), para 6.4. 414 Condron v the United Kingdom [2000] ECHR 191, para 56; Beckles v the United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 661, para 58. 415 John Murray v the United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 3, para 47; Condron v the United Kingdom [2000] ECHR 191, para 56; Beckles v the United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 661, para 58.