Chapter i  Fair Trial Standards: Scope of Application 27 1.1.3 Purpose and severity of penalty The final, alternative, criterion for deciding whether or not a charge is “criminal” concerns the degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risks incurring, or actually incurred. Key to this issue is the aim of the penalty, i.e., whether or not it is intended to “punish” a person for wrongdoing and/or deter reoffending.47 Account must be had, in this regard, to the seriousness of what is at stake, and the nature, duration or manner of execution of the penalty imposed.48 In almost all instances, a penalty which involves the deprivation of liberty will amount to a “punishment” and will mean that the charge is treated as a criminal one, even in those cases where a pecuniary penalty is ordered instead.49 In Demicoli v Malta, for example, the Court took note of the fact that although the House of Representatives imposed a fine on the applicant, the maximum penalty he risked was imprisonment for a period not exceeing 60 days. What was at stake was thus sufficiently important to warrant classifying the matter as a criminal one.50 In Ezeh and Connors v the United Kingdom, the applicants were convicted prisoners and challenged the “disciplinary” classification of prison rules. The European Court of Human Rights explained that the realities of each situation should be considered. In that case, the applicants were awarded additional days of non-parole. Although this did not increase their sentence as a matter of domestic law, it meant that the possibility of early release for good behaviour was delayed. Finding that this amounted to a criminal punishment, the European Court concluded that: “The reality of awards of additional days was that prisoners were detained in prison beyond the date on which they would otherwise have been released, as a consequence of separate disciplinary proceedings which were legally unconnected to the original conviction and sentence.”51 There may be circumstances, however, where the deprivation of liberty does not by itself render the proceedings criminal in nature, such as the detention of an alien pending her/ his expulsion (See also 1.3). High financial penalties aimed at deterring reoffending will often also be considered to be punitive in nature, as in Lauko v Slovakia.52 The freezing of assets of persons listed as terrorist entities was not, however, considered by the Human Rights Committee in Sayadi 47 Ravnsborg v Sweden [1994] ECHR 11, para 35; A. P., M. P. and T. P. v Switzerland [1997] ECHR 50, para 41; and Lauko v Slovakia [1998] ECHR 82, para 58; Bendenoun v France [1994] ECHR 7, para 47. 48 Engel and Others v the Netherlands [1976] ECHR 3, para 81. 49 Engel and Others v the Netherlands [1976] ECHR 3, para 81. 50 Demicoli v Malta [1991] 14 EHRR 47, para 34. 51 Ezeh and Connors v the United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 595, para 123. 52 Lauko v Slovakia [1998] ECHR 82, para 58.