62 Legal Digest of International Fair Trial Rights of Human Rights has recognized the difficulty of establishing a breach of Article 6 of the ECHR on account of subjective partiality and, for this reason, has in the vast majority of cases focused on the objective aspects of impartiality.221 However, there is no clear-cut division between the two notions since the conduct of a judge may not only prompt misgivings as to impartiality from the point of view of the external observer (objective test) but may also go to the issue of her/his personal conviction (subjective test).222 3.3.2(a) Subjective impartiality The first of the dual criteria of impartiality is that judicial officers must exercise their function without regard to any personal view or conviction about the parties or the nature of the proceedings. In applying the subjective test, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently reaffirmed the principle that a tribunal shall be presumed to be free of personal prejudice or partiality until there is proof to the contrary.223 It reflects an important element of the rule of law, namely that the verdicts of a tribunal should be final and binding unless set aside by a superior court on the basis of irregularity or unfairness.224 Judges must act without personal bias or prejudice, and without any preconceptions about the case before them.225 The subjective test of impartiality, therefore, aims at determining the personal conviction of a judge in a given case.226 As regards the type of proof required, the European Court of Human Rights has, for example, sought to ascertain whether a judge has displayed hostility or ill-will, or has arranged to have a case assigned to her/himself for personal reasons.227 Subjective impartiality was found to be lacking in Lavents v Latvia, where the trial judge made comments to the media before the trial, in which he referred to the possibility of conviction or partial acquittal of the defendant, without mentioning the possibility of total acquittal. This was taken to infer a personal bias, or pre-determination, of the case and, thus, was in violation of the requirement of impartiality.228 In general, with regard to the use of the media by the judges, the European Court has taken the view that judicial authorities are required to exercise maximum discretion with regard to the cases with which they deal in order to preserve their image as impartial judges, thus affecting their objective impartiality [1982] ECHR 6, para 30; Incal v Turkey [1998] ECHR 48, para 65; and Wettstein v Switzerland [2000] ECHR 695, para 42; Kyprianou v Cyprus [2005] ECHR 873, para 118; Sara Lind Eggertsdóttir v Iceland [2007] ECHR 553, para 41. 221 Kyprianou v Cyprus [2005] ECHR 873, para 119. 222 Kyprianou v Cyprus [2005] ECHR 873, para 119. 223 Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium [1981] ECHR 3, para 58 in fine; Campbell and Fell v the United Kingdom [1984] ECHR 8, para 84; Hauschildt v Denmark [1989] ECHR 7, para 47; Padovani v Italy [1993] ECHR 12, para 26; Kyprianou v Cyprus [2005] ECHR 873, para 119. 224 Kyprianou v Cyprus [2005] ECHR 873, para 119. 225 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 32 (2007), para 21; and Karttunen v Finland, HRC Communication 387/1989, UN Doc CCPR/C/46/D/387/1989 (1992), para 7.2. 226 Piersack v Belgium [1982] ECHR 6, para 30; Kyprianou v Cyprus [2005] ECHR 873, para 118. 227 Kyprianou v Cyprus [2005] ECHR 873, para 119. 228 Lavents v Latvia [2002] ECHR 786, para 119, available in French only.