CAT/C/54/D/539/2013 used to extract information and force confessions in fabricated criminal cases cannot be unknown to the Swedish migration authorities. State party’s observations on admissibility and merits 4.1 By note verbale of 16 September 2013, the State party submitted its observations on the admissibility and merits of the communication. Based on the facts of the case, the State party notes that the complainant arrived in Sweden on 17 May 2011 and applied for asylum two days later. The Swedish Migration Board rejected his application and ordered his deportation to the Russian Federation on 3 October 2011. The complainant appealed that decision before the Migration Court, which rejected the appeal on 18 September 2012. On 17 October 2012, the Migration Court of Appeal refused to grant the complainant leave to appeal that decision, and the decision to expel the complainant became final and nonappealable on 7 November 2012. 4.2 The State party further notes that according to article 22 (5) (a) of the Convention, the Committee shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that the same matter has not been, and is not being, examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement and states that it is not aware whether the present case was or is subject to any other such investigation or settlement. However, the State party acknowledges that all available domestic remedies have been exhausted in the present case. 4.3 The State party maintains that the complainant’s assertion that he would be at risk of being treated in a manner that would violate article 3 of the Convention if returned to the Russian Federation fails to rise to the minimum level of substantiation required for purposes of admissibility. It submits that the present communication is manifestly unfounded and thus inadmissible under article 22 (2) of the Convention and rule 113 (b) of the Committee’s rules of procedure.1 Should the Committee conclude that the communication is admissible, the issue before it would be whether the forced return of the complainant to the Russian Federation would violate the obligation of Sweden under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or return a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 4.4 The State party notes that, when determining whether the forced return of a person to another country would constitute a violation of article 3 of the Convention, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee has repeatedly emphasized that the aim of such a determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. Therefore, it follows that the existence of such a pattern in itself is not a sufficient ground for concluding that an individual would be at risk of being subjected to torture upon his or her return to that country. Additional grounds must exist to show that the individual concerned would be “personally” at risk.2 4.5 In the light of the foregoing, the State party notes that, in determining whether the forced return of the complainant to the Russian Federation would constitute a breach of 1 2 The State party refers to communication No. 216/2002, H. I. A. v. Sweden, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 2 May 2003, para. 6.2. The State party refers to communications No. 150/1999, S. L. v. Sweden, Views adopted on 11 May 2001, para. 6.3; and No. 213/2002, E. J. V. M. v. Sweden, Views adopted on 14 November 2003, para. 8.3. 5