CEDAW/C/50/D/26/2010 remedy in respect of her first PRRA application. The State party also stresses that if the author is successful in her second PRRA application, which remains pending, she would become a protected person, and could apply for permanent residence status and ultimately citizenship. If she were unsuccessful, she could then seek leave to apply for judicial review of the negative decision, and raise more fully any arguments that immigration officers erred by failing to take into account the appropriate factors such as, for instance, those raised in the March 2010 and May 2010 reports of non-governmental organizations. The author could also, at that point, more appropriately raise any argument that the risks of domestic violence she faces if removed to Mexico are serious enough to threaten her constitutional right to life, liberty and security of the person (section 7 of the Canadian Charter on Rights and Freedoms). In conclusion, the State party contends that there are still effective domestic procedures available to the author, and that the Committee should thus find that her communication is inadmissible by virtue of article 4, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol. Author’s comments on the State party’s observations on admissibility 5.1 In a submission dated 27 March 2011, the author reiterates her initial claims and challenges the State party’s argument that the communication should be declared inadmissible. 5.2 Regarding the State party’s argument that the State party does not hold responsibilities vis-à-vis acts contrary to the Convention, which may occur in Mexico after her deportation, the author stresses that the State party does have responsibilities, under the Convention, regarding the direct and foreseeable consequences of her potential deportation to Mexico. 13 She adds that the harm she is alleging amounts to a threat to life, given her abusive exspouse’s threat to kill her. She further alleges that the gender-based violence which she has suffered, and at which she would be at serious risk if deported to Mexico, also constitutes a form of cruel and unusual punishment or treatment, which amounts to discrimination, within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention.14 The author also contends that contrary to the State party’s assertion, the Human Rights Committee’s jurisprudence has established that States have responsibilities, in deportation contexts, which go beyond the risk to the right to life, or risk to face cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 15 5.3 With regard to the State party’s argument that her allegations are ill-founded and insufficiently substantiated, the author stresses that her communication before the Committee is not based on the same facts and evidence, which were reviewed by the State party’s decision-makers during her initial PRRA and H&C applications. The new evidence she submitted (non-governmental reports assessing the availability of State protection for women victims of domestic violence in Mexico) were not available at that time, and thus never submitted to the State party’s relevant jurisdictions. When her H&C application was considered in October 2009, the general law adopted by Mexico on women’s access to a life free from violence (2007) was still very new and lacked implementation. 5.4 Regarding the State party’s argument that she has failed to exhaust domestic remedies with respect to her initial PRRA application, the author notes that she subsequently submitted __________________ 13 14 15 8 The author refers to N.S.F. v. the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (note 5 above), para. 7.3. The author refers to the Committee’s general recommendation 19, paras. 6 and 7. The author refers to Human Rights Committee communications No. 930/2000, Winata et al v. Australia, Views adopted on 26 July 2001, para. 7.3, and No. 1011/2001, Madafferi v. Australia, Views adopted on 26 July 2004, para. 9.8.