CCPR/C/128/D/2384/2014 running over his friend with a car and that the State party has failed to effectively investigate his allegations of torture. In that regard, the Committee notes that the author provides a detailed account of the different types of torture to which he was subjected and the names of the police officers responsible for those acts. The Committee also notes that the copies of the forensic medical examinations confirm that the author sustained various injuries, whose occurrence coincides with the time of his detention at the Suzak district police station. The Committee observes that, although the domestic courts decided that the conclusions of the second forensic examination, which contained the most detailed answers to the questions concerning the time of occurrence, severity and cause of the author’s injuries, were not correct, they provided no explanation as to the origin of the injuries in question. 6.3 The Committee recalls that a State party is responsible for the security of any person it holds in detention and that, when an individual in detention shows signs of injury, it is incumbent upon the State party to produce evidence showing that it is not responsible. 6 The Committee has held on several occasions that the burden of proof in such cases also cannot rest with the author of a communication alone, especially considering that frequently only the State party has access to the relevant information.7 In the absence of any observations by the State party to counter the claims made by the author, the Committee decides that due weight must be given to the author’s allegations. 6.4 Regarding the State party’s obligation to properly investigate the author’s claims of torture, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence according to which criminal investigation and consequential prosecution are necessary remedies for violations of human rights, such as those protected by article 7 of the Covenant. 8 The Committee also recalls that, once a complaint about ill-treatment contrary to article 7 has been filed, a State party must investigate it promptly and impartially so as to make the remedy effective. 9 In the present case, the Committee notes that, on 18 May 2009, the author lodged a complaint with the Suzak district prosecutor’s office containing allegations of torture that and he immediately named all of the perpetrators and underwent a medical examination of his injuries on the following day. Despite that and the fact that the second medical examination concluded that the injuries had most likely been caused by police batons or similar objects around the time when the author was held in police custody, the Suzak district prosecutor’s office and the Suzak district police department both opted to close the investigation, citing a lack of corpus delicti and the absence of known perpetrators. The Committee observes that, although the formal investigation into the allegations commenced on 3 June 2009, the perpetrators were not criminally charged until 16 October 2009. In that regard, the Committee takes note of the author’s claim that, owing to the delay in launching the investigation and bringing charges, the authorities failed to seize important evidence, such as checking for traces of his blood in the room where he was tortured and on the clothing of the police officers, which could have been vital in the trial against them. 6.5 The Committee observes that, at the author’s trial, despite the author’s claims to the effect that his confession was obtained through torture, the court ruled that the confession was not coerced, and the author’s claim of torture was found to constitute a defence strategy aimed at avoiding criminal liability. By the time the trial of the four police officers began, therefore, the Suzak district court had already made its determination as to how the author’s confession had been obtained. The Committee takes note of the author’s allegation that, given that the same prosecutor participated in both trials, he could not have been impartial in pursuing the charges against the police officers, because their convictions for beatings and extracting a forced confession would have negatively affected the author’s conviction. 6 7 8 9 See, for example, Eshonov and Eshonov v. Uzbekistan (CCPR/C/99/D/1225/2003), para. 9.8; Siragev v. Uzbekistan (CCPR/C/85/D/907/2000), para. 6.2; and Zheikov v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/86/D/889/1999), para. 7.2. See, for example, Mukong v. Cameroon (CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991), para. 9.2; and Belier v. Uruguay, communication No. 30/1978, para. 13.3. See the Committee’s general comment No. 20 (1992) on the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, para. 14; and general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, para. 18. See the Committee’s general comment No. 20, para. 14; and, for example, Neporozhnev v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/116/D/1941/2010), para. 8.4. 5