institutional level as systems are reformed to improve accountability. To the extent that information, when shared, feeds into other processes, deterrence may also be a secondary effect. A forensic police officer examines fingerprints during an investigation. UN Photo / Martine Perret 5. Human rights due diligence policy The United Nations provides support for many national security forces, some of which have been the subject of investigations, such as in the Central African Republic, Guinea, South Sudan, Iraq, Burundi, Libya, Sri Lanka, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire and Timor-Leste. The organization’s Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces precludes support for forces where there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk those forces may be involved in grave violations of international human rights law, international humanitarian law or international refugee law, and this risk cannot be mitigated.31 The policy is invoked in a scenario where those who directly perpetrate such violations, or civilian or military authorities that fail in their (command) responsibilities, are present among forces receiving or requesting United Nations support – frequently in the context of peacekeeping operations.32 And where the relevant authorities fail to take the necessary corrective or mitigating measures. See “Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces”, 2015, A/67/775 – S/2013/110, para. 1. 32 The United Nations Guidance Note on the policy specifically mentions CoIs when listing potential United Nations sources of information on violations and crimes. See Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces, Guidance Note and text of the Policy (2015), p. 21. 31 22 ATTRIBUTING INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY