Example 2: CoI Libya 2012 In the course of its investigations in Libya, the CoI examined allegations levelled at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces which, acting under a United Nations mandate, were carrying out airstrikes against pro-government forces: “A number of NATO airstrikes, however, were the subject of allegations of civilian casualties, which the Commission investigated. Allegations of civilian casualties during the conflict came from the then Libyan government, which it alleged amounted to an indiscriminate attack on civilians, or media reports. Others were reported by witnesses during the Commission’s field missions. Some of these claims were backed up by evidence subsequently gathered by the Commission.84 ... “The Commission found no evidence on the ground, or through satellite imagery analysis, that the site had a military purpose. On the basis of the information received by the Commission, it seems clear that those killed were all civilians. NATO’s response to the Commission did not provide an adequate explanation of the military value of the target, nor an explanation of the second strike.85 ... “NATO first stated the houses were not the target of the attack and they may have been hit due to a weapon malfunction. Later, in a letter to the Commission, NATO said the intended target was the Tarabalus SA-2 Support Facility. However, NATO stated the weapon impact was not observed and NATO was unable to determine where it landed, though they acknowledge it was possible the errant bomb caused the casualties.”86 The Libya CoI had an allegation of indiscriminate shelling that was apparently supported through its investigation on the ground. When it approached NATO, as the alleged perpetrator, for their version of events, some facts were clarified while others were not. The investigation demonstrated its impartiality by pursuing sources from various sides of the incident. Good practice: Where an investigative body has sufficient time and resources, it may consider creating a mechanism inside the secretariat to help ensure its findings A/HRC/19/68, para. 610. Ibid. para. 625. 86 Ibid. para. 628. 84 85 COLLECTING AND ANALYSING THE INFORMATION 45