DETENTION MONITORING TOOL FACTSHEET 59. Rule 57 (2), the Nelson Mandela Rules; Rule 25 (1), the Bangkok Rules. 60. Rule 57 (3), the Nelson Mandela Rules. 61. In many national legal systems, torture and sometimes also other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment constitute a crime; the UN Convention against Torture (Art. 4) stipulates that State Parties ensure that all acts of torture as defined in the Convention are offences under criminal law. However, even if this is not the case, other criminal law provisions, such as abuse of power, serious bodily harm or rape, will be applicable in case of allegations of torture. 62. Rules 57 (3) and 71, the Nelson Mandela Rules. 63. Preamble of the CED. 64. Art. 1 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/133, 18 December 1992. 65. Note that in accordance with Art. 3 CED, acts of disappearance committed by private individuals or groups shall be officially investigated by the State authorities. 66. Art. 12 CED. 67. Various United Nations human rights mechanisms, such as the Human Rights Committee, the Committee against Torture, and special procedures of the Human Rights Council have called for the abolition of incommunicado detention. The former United Nations Commission on Human Rights has repeatedly reaffirmed that ‘prolonged incommunicado detention may facilitate the perpetration of torture and can in itself constitute a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or even torture’. Despite this, many countries retain the legal possibility to hold persons, particularly terrorism suspects, incommunicado for a certain amount of days. 68. Rules 6 and 7, the Nelson Mandela Rules; the Havana Rules, para. 21; Art. 17 CED. 69. In the case of Mikiashvili v. Georgia, Application no. 18996/06, judgment of 9 October 2012, para. 87, the ECtHR held ‘all the investigative measures were conducted by the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Justice, the very same Ministry which was in charge of the prison system. Their findings were then simply endorsed by a prosecutor. [...] This institutional connection between the investigators and those implicated in the incident raises legitimate doubts as to the independence of the investigation conducted’. 70. In the case of Dvalishvili vs. Georgia, Application no. 19634/07, judgment of 18 December 2012, para. 50, the ECtHR noted, ‘the authorities accepted the credibility of the police officers’ testimonies without giving any convincing reasons for doing so, despite the fact that those officers’ statements might have been subjective and aimed at evading criminal liability for the purported ill-treatment of the applicant’. 71. ECtHR, Pa˘duret¸ vs. Moldova, Application no. 33134/03, judgment of 5 January 2010, para. 63. 72. ECtHR, Buzilo vs. Moldova, Application no. 52643/07, judgment of 21 February 2012, paras. 31 and 32. 73. Istanbul Protocol, para. 116; Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on eradicating impunity for serious human rights violations, VII. 74. Minnesota Protocol, paras. 32 and 33. 75. Art. 13 CAT; Art. 12 (4) CED; Istanbul Protocol, para. 112; Minnesota Protocol, paras. 86 and 87; Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on eradicating impunity for serious human rights violations, VII (6). 76. Note, however, that a transfer to another establishment could be seriously detrimental for the prisoner concerned, in particular when moved far from his/her family. In such a case, a transfer should be used as a protection measure only if no other measures are available. 77. Rule 45, the Nelson Mandela Rules. Penal Reform International and Association for the Prevention of Torture | Incident management and independent investigations | 11