CAT/C/28/D/146/1999 page 6 4.5 Moreover, the Refugee Board found that even if the detention had taken place, they did not consider that the complainant risked persecution and torture if returned to Georgia. According to the State party, this assessment corresponds with the Committee’s jurisprudence in A.L.N v. Switzerland and X, Y and Z v. Sweden.5 4.6 The State party emphasizes that there is no objective evidence to support the complainant’s claim that she has been subjected to torture,6 nor has it been established that she is wanted by Georgian authorities.7 The State party emphasizes that after her liberation, the complainant moved to the Gegetjkori region and resumed her political activities, but that she has not alleged any problems with the authorities while she resided there,8 and that the events that motivated her departure date relatively far back in time.9 4.7 The Refugee Board did not attach importance to the declaration of the complainant’s neighbours, explaining that the authorities persecuted her family by visiting and threatening them, as this allegation was submitted at a later stage in the asylum proceedings and had not been mentioned in her previous statements. The State party refers to the Committee’s practice that if a complainant changes his or her account during the processing of the asylum application, it is important that a logical explanation be given for doing so.10 4.8 The State party also considers it to be consistent with the Committee’s jurisprudence, that due weight be given to the fact that the Convention against Torture entered into force for Georgia on 25 November 1994. The complainant’s comments on the State party’s observations 5.1 In a letter of 7 February 2000, counsel refers to the Committee’s jurisprudence in E.A. v. Switzerland11 stating that it is sufficient that “‘substantial grounds’ in article 3 require more than a mere possibility of torture but do not need to be highly likely to occur to satisfy that provision’s conditions”, and contends that the complainant fulfils this condition. 5.2 Regarding the State party’s argument that the complainant’s father did not mention in his asylum application that he participated in the liberation of prisoners, among them the complainant, this is explained by his general scepticism towards authorities and his mental situation subsequent to his partisan life. 5.3 Furthermore, the complainant cannot document that she has been subjected to torture, including rape, as she has not undergone a medical examination in this regard. Her reluctance to submit this information to the Danish authorities is explainable by the trauma of such experiences. Counsel quotes the Committee’s jurisprudence in Kisoki v. Sweden 12 that “complete accuracy is seldom to be expected by victims of torture and that such inconsistencies as may exist in the author’s presentation of the facts are not material and do not raise doubts about the general veracity of the author’s claims”.