CCPR/C/114/D/2428/2014 5.2 On 13 June 2013, the author’s counsel was contacted by a social worker at the asylum camp, who reported that the author did not wish to return to Italy. On 16 June 2014, the author’s counsel informed the national police by phone that the author did not wish to leave voluntarily and that the planned deportation could not be regarded as a voluntarily departure. The police replied that they were planning to return the author on 20 June 2014, regardless of the non-voluntary nature of the return. 5.3 The author reiterates that it is peculiar that the refugee appeals board ruled that the author and her children could be forcibly deported to Somalia, although the national police were planning to deport her to Italy owing to her Italian residence permit. However, neither the immigration service nor the refugee appeals board have approved the deportation to Italy or given the Italian immigration authorities prior notice of the deportation in order to secure basic reception facilities upon arrival. 5.4 With respect to exhaustion of national remedies, the author stresses that, as an uneducated Somali woman, she has not in verbal or written form explicitly expressed her claim regarding article 7 of the Covenant. This, however, does not exempt the Danish authorities from their general responsibility and international obligations. The author had left Italy owing to urgent humanitarian reasons and had applied for asylum in Denmark. She had, in her own practical terms, described her problems in Italy to the Danish immigration service and the Danish refugee appeals board. It was then incumbent on the board to make sure that the deportation to Italy would not violate the international obligations of Denmark, regardless of whether the applicant explicitly invokes the relevant legal provisions. 5.5 With respect to the case law from the European Court of Human Rights adduced by the State party, the author stresses that the decision in Samsam Mohammed Hussein that a return to Italy would not constitute a breach of article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was made on the assumption that “the Netherlands authorities [would] give prior notice to their Italian counterparts of the transfer of the applicant and her children, allowing the Italian authorities to prepare for their arrival” (paragraph 77). The author referred to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights decision of 4 November 2014 in Tarakhel v. Switzerland regarding an asylum seeking family with six minor children, who were to be transferred to Italy from Switzerland in accordance with the Dublin Regulation. The living conditions and difficulties in finding shelter for asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection in Italy is relevant to the present case. The Court found that, even though the current situation in Italy could not be compared to the situation in Greece at the time of the judgement in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, a similar approach should be adopted, namely, to examine “the applicant’s individual situation in the light of the overall situation prevailing in Greece at the relevant time” (para. 101). 5.6 Regarding the current situation in Italy, the Court, still following the approach from the M.S.S. judgement, stated that “the possibility that a significant number of asylum seekers may be left without accommodation or accommodated in overcrowded facilities without any privacy, or even in insalubrious or violent conditions, [could] not be dismissed as unfounded” (para. 115). The Court concluded that, if no proper reception facilities adapted to children were available, “the conditions in question would attain the threshold of severity required to come within the scope of the prohibition under article 3 of the Convention” (para. 119). Accordingly, the Court found it to be “incumbent on the Swiss authorities to obtain assurances from their Italian counterparts that, on their arrival in Italy, the applicants will be received in facilities and in conditions adapted to the age of the children” (para. 120). 5.7 The author submits that the Tarakhel decision is relevant to her case, as the living conditions for asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection must be regarded 8