OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FRENCH CGLPL unrelated to market rates or whose prices have not been approved: for example, one estimate amounted to 3'152 euros when, according to experts consulted by the Contrôleur général, a price of between 1'500 and 1'700 euros was deemed more realistic. Fourthly, in some prisons, the state of the electricity supply network means that all computer equipment is banned from cells. Fifthly, some bans lack any logic enabling them to be explained and understood. In establishments like this, printers are allowed (to some extent) but blank paper is not. In particular, the authorities are resolutely hostile towards any techniques or equipment allowing communication with others. For this reason, no “new-generation” games consoles can be purchased, nor, in general terms, can any wireless peripherals. As far as information storage media are concerned, only diskettes are allowed, but USB sticks and external hard disks are not, for example. Lastly, there is no access to on-line services, either within cells or from supervised communal areas. 5/ Relaxing the rules governing access to IT facilities is necessary not only in order to reconcile the conflicting requirements of freedom of information and of security imperatives, but also with a view to improving the reintegration of persons held in custody and reducing the levels of reoffending, thereby leading to enhanced security for our society. To this end, drawing inspiration in particular from experiments already under way (the “Cyber-base®Justice” experiments in Marseilles, Bordeaux-Gradignan, Amiens, Saint-Martin-de-Ré and Metz-Queuleu prisons, in association with the Caisse des dépôts et consignations): 6/ The distinction introduced by the 2009 circular should be maintained: the options opened up by owning and using computer equipment should be extended further into communal areas, rather than restricting their use to cells. 7/ The authorities must be able to check on the use and storage of computer equipment, in order to satisfy security requirements. However, the reasons for carrying out such checks cannot be any different from the long-standing checks applied to mail and phone calls, the sole purpose of which must be to ensure that any data used or stored is not likely to compromise the reintegration of the person concerned or to compromise law and order, and security. Furthermore, the protection of personal data, as provided for by the 102