EL HASKI v. BELGIUM JUDGMENT 31 ensuring that it left no visible signs on the victim. All too frequently, those who were charged with ensuring that torture did not occur – courts, prosecutors and medical personnel – were complicit in its concealment. The Court observed that, in a criminal justice system where the courts were independent of the executive, where cases were prosecuted impartially, and where allegations of torture were conscientiously investigated, one might conceivably require a defendant to prove to a high standard that the evidence against him had been obtained by torture. However, in a criminal justice system which was complicit in the very practices which it existed to prevent, such a standard of proof was wholly inappropriate (ibid., § 276). 87. As to the standard of proof for the application of the exclusionary rule in respect of evidence allegedly obtained as a result of treatment contrary to Article 3, a number of situations may arise. Firstly, such treatment may be imputed to the authorities of the forum State or to those of a third State and the victim may be the actual defendant or a third party. Furthermore, in some cases the Court itself (see, for example, Levinta v. Moldova, no. 17332/03, 16 December 2008), the courts of the forum State (see, for example, the Harutyunyan judgment, cited above) or the courts of the third State have confirmed the veracity and nature of the alleged illtreatment; in other cases there has been no such judicial decision. 88. The Court will not proceed to examine each of those situations. It is sufficient in the present case for it to observe that, at least in a case where a defendant asks the domestic court to exclude statements obtained in a third State as a result, in his submission, of treatment contrary to Article 3 inflicted on another individual, it is appropriate to follow the approach set out in the Othman judgment, cited above. Accordingly, in any event, where the judicial system of the third State in question does not offer meaningful guarantees of an independent, impartial and serious examination of allegations of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment, it will be necessary and sufficient for the complainant, if the exclusionary rule is to be invoked on the basis of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, to show that there is a “real risk” that the impugned statement was thus obtained. It would be unfair to impose any higher burden of proof on him. 89. The domestic court may not then admit the impugned evidence without having first examined the defendant’s arguments concerning it and without being satisfied that, notwithstanding those arguments, no such risk obtains. This is inherent in a court’s responsibility to ensure that those appearing before it are guaranteed a fair hearing, and in particular to verify that the fairness of the proceedings is not undermined by the conditions in which the evidence on which it relies has been obtained (see, mutatis mutandis, Stojkovic v. France and Belgium, no. 25303/08, 7 April 2011, § 55).