and accurate information. History and a consideration of human behavior would appear to refute this assumption.48 Studies included in a 2006 comprehensive scientific report published by the US National Defense Intelligence College underscore the lack of scientific evidence that coercive interrogation is an effective way to obtain reliable, actionable information. Dr. Randy Borum, a behavioral science consultant on counterintelligence and national security issues, concludes that “the preponderance of reports seems to weigh against [the] effectiveness” of coercive techniques or torture: “The effects of common stress and duress techniques are known to impair various aspects of a person’s cognitive functioning, including those functions necessary to retrieve and produce accurate, useful information.”49 In strategic terms, a policy that turns a blind eye to torture is counterproductive in the longterm, by deepening the grievances and sense of injustice that fuel radicalization and recruitment to terrorism. Considerable expert consensus exists that anger over abuses committed in the name of fighting terrorism or insurgency, including torture, plays a role in the radicalization process.50 Human Rights Watch believes the absolute prohibition on torture imposes on states the duty to repudiate publicly the use of torture information, take reasonable steps to ensure they never knowingly send or receive torture information, and take steps to influence governments where torture occurs to eradicate the practice. 48 Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, “Operational Issues Pertaining to the Use of Physical/Psychological Coercion in Interrogation,” July 2002, quoted in Peter Finn and Joby Warrick, “In 2002, Military Agency Warned Against Torture,” Washington Post, April 25, 2009. 49 Randy Borum, Psy.D, “Approaching Truth: Behavioral Science Lessons on Educing Information from Human Sources,” Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art: Intelligence Science Board Study Report on Educing Information, Phase 1 (Washington DC: National Defense Intelligence College Press, September 2006), p. 35. In another study included in this report, Colonel Steven M. Kleinman, a Reserve Senior Intelligence Officer and Mobilization Augmentee to the Director, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, HQ Air Force Special Operations Command, argues “there seems to be an unsubstantiated assumption that ‘compliance’ carries the same connotation as ‘meaningful cooperation’ (i.e. a source induced to provide accurate, relevant information of potential intelligence value)” and that “Claims from some members of the operational community as to the alleged effectiveness of coercive methods in educing meaningful information from resistant sources are, at best, anecdotal in nature and would be, in the author’s view, unlikely to withstand the rigors of scientific inquiry.” Steven M. Kleinman, “KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Review: Observations of an Interrogator,” in Educing Information, p. 130 and footnote 91. 50 See for example, Change Institute for the Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security, European Commission, “Studies into violent radicalization; Lot 2. The beliefs ideologies and narratives,” http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/prevention/fsj_terrorism_prevent_en, accessed May 7, 2010); Todd C. Helmus, “Why and How Some People Become Terrorists,” in Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together, Rand National Defense Research Institute, www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG849.pdf (accessed May 7, 2010). “No Questions Asked” 20