CEDAW/C/57/D/39/2012 bring before the Committee 32 so as to provide the domestic authorities and/or courts with an opportunity to deal with such a claim. 33 6.4 The Committee notes the State party’s contention that the author limited her complaint to a violation of the non-refoulement principle and did not invoke sex-based discrimination. The Committee recalls that the essence of the non-refoulement principle is that a State shall not return persons to a territory where they may be exposed to persecution, including gender-related forms and grounds of persecution. It also recalls that the non-refoulement principle constitutes an essential component of asylum and international refugee protection. It recalls its jurisprudence, according to which article 2 (d) of the Convention encompasses the obligation of States parties to protect women from being exposed to a real, personal and foreseeable risk of serious forms of gender-based violence, irrespective of whether such consequences would take place outside the territorial bound aries of the sending State party. 34 The Committee further recalls that gender-based violence is a form of discrimination against women and includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. 35 In the circumstances, even assuming that the author did not specifically allege sex-related discrimination before the national authorities, the Committee considers that sex-based violence, sexual slavery and physical abuse, directed against her as a woman, were raised by her when seeking asylum and that the competent authorities had thus an opportunity to examine those claims. The Committee observes that it remains unchallenged by the State party that there has been no other procedure available to the author domestically where she could raise the sex-discrimination claim in substance. The Committee considers, therefore, that it is not precluded under article 4 (1) of the Optional Protocol from examining the present communication. 6.5 The Committee further takes note of the State party’s arguments that the communication should be declared inadmissible ratione materiae because the author seeks to expand the protection offered by the Convention in an extraterritorial manner and widen its ambit to include the non-refoulement principle; that the State party cannot be held liable for violations, real or alleged, of the Convention by another State party; and that the Committee lacks jurisdiction over the alleged violations with regard to the Netherlands. 6.6 Having regard to the Committee’s definition of gender-based violence 35 and its jurisprudence relating to the applicability of the Convention ratione materiae, ratione loci and in an extraterritorial manner, 34 the Committee considers itself competent to examine the communication. In view of the foregoing, the Committee has to determine, for purposes of admissibility under article 4 (2)(c) of the Optional Protocol, whether the author has made a prima facie case by sufficiently substantiating her allegations of violation of articles 1, 2 (e), 3 and 6 of the Convention by the State party. The Committee also has to assess whether the author has provided adequate information as to whether she would be exposed to a real, __________________ 32 33 34 35 14/16 See communication No. 8/2005, Kayhan v. Turkey, decision of 27 January 2006, para. 7.7. See communication No. 10/2005, N.S.F. v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, decision of 30 May 2007, para. 7.3. See, for example, communication No. 33/2011, M.N.N. v. Denmark, decision of 15 July 2013, paras. 8.5-8.10; and communication No. 35/2011, M.E.N. v. Denmark, decision of 26 July 2013, paras. 8.4-8.9. See paragraph 6 of general recommendation No. 19. 14-26326