3.4 The author submits that article 12, paragraph 4, is applicable to his situation since, for all practical purposes, Canada is his own country. His deportation from Canada would result in an absolute statutory bar from reentering Canada. It is noted in this context that article 12 (4) does not indicate that everyone has the right to enter his country of nationality or of birth but only “his own country”. Counsel argues that the U.K. is no longer the author's “own country”, since he left it at the age of seven and his entire life is now centred upon his family in Canada - thus, although not Canadian in a formal sense, he must be considered de facto a Canadian citizen. Canada would not only require ministerial consent but also that the author fulfil all the other statutory admissibility criteria for immigrants. Furthermore, because of his convictions, the author would be barred from readmission to Canada under Section 19 (2) (a) of the Act. 2.7 As the deportation order against the author could now be enforced at any point in time, counsel requests the Committee to seek from the State party interim measures of protection, pursuant to rule 86 of the rules of procedure. The complaint 3.1 The author claims that the above facts reveal violations of articles 7, 9, 12, 13, 17 and 23 of the Covenant. He claims that in respect of article 23, the State party has failed to provide for clear legislative recognition of the protection of the family. In the absence of such legislation which ensures that family interests would be given due weight in administrative proceedings such as, for example, those before the Immigration and Refugee Board, he claims, there is a prima facie issue as to whether Canadian law is compatible with the requirement of protection of the family. 3.5 The author affirms that his allegations under articles 17 and 23 should also be examined in the light of other provisions, especially articles 9 and 12. While article 9 addresses deprivation of liberty, there is no indication that the only concept of liberty is one of physical freedom. Article 12 recognizes liberty in a broader sense: the author believes that his deportation from Canada would violate “his liberty of movement within Canada and within his community”, and that it would not be necessary for one of the legitimate objectives enumerated in article 12, paragraph 3. 3.2 The author also refers to the Committee's General Comment on article 17, according to which “interference [with home and privacy] can only take place on the basis of law, which itself must be compatible with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant”. He asserts that there is no law which ensures that his legitimate family interests or those of the members of his family would be addressed in deciding on his deportation from Canada; there is only the vague and general discretion given to the Immigration Appeal Division to consider all the circumstances of the case, which is said to be insufficient to ensure a balancing of his family interests and other legitimate State aims. In its decision, the Immigration Appeal Division allegedly did not give any weight to the disabilities of the author's mother and brother; instead, it ruled that “taking into account that the appellant does not have anyone depending on him and there being no real attachment to and no real support from anyone, the Appeal Division sees insufficient circumstances to justify the appellant's presence in this country”. 3.6 The author contends that the enforcement of the deportation order would amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of article 7 of the Covenant. He concedes that the Committee has not yet decided whether the permanent separation of an individual from his/her family and/or close relatives and the effective banishment of a person from the only country he ever knew and in which he grew up may amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; he submits that this is an issue to be determined on its merits. 3.7 In this connection, the author recalls that (a) he has resided in Canada since the age of seven; (b) at the time of issue of the deportation order all members of his immediate family resided in Canada; (c) while his criminal record is extensive, it does by no means reveal that he is a danger to public safety; (d) he has taken voluntary steps to control his substance-abuse problems; (e) deportation from Canada would effectively and permanently sever all his ties in Canada; and (f) the prison terms served for various convictions already constitute adequate punishment and the reasoning of the Immigration Appeal Division, by emphasizing his criminal record, amounts to the imposition of additional punishment. 3.3 According to the author, the term “home” should be interpreted broadly, encompassing the (entire) community of which an individual is a part. In this sense, his “home” is said to be Canada. It is further submitted that the author's privacy must include the fact of being able to live within this community without arbitrary or unlawful interference. To the extent that Canadian law does not protect aliens against such interference, the author claims a violation of article 17. Special Rapporteur's request for interim measures of protection and State party's reaction 4.1 On 26 April 1993, the Special Rapporteur on New Communications transmitted the communication to the State party, requesting it, under rule 91 of the 50