in Port-of-Spain. The length of detention on death row in this case is unprecedented and a matter of serious concern. However, it remains the jurisprudence of the Committee that the length of detention on death row does not, per se, amount to a violation of articles 7 or 10, paragraph 1. The Committee’s detailed Views on this issue were set out in the Views on communication No. 588/1994 (Errol Johnson v. Jamaica)3. Because of the importance of the issue, the Committee deems it appropriate to reiterate its position. for the applicants in the case of Pratt and Morgan v. Attorney-General of Jamaica. Committee’s admissibility decision 4.1 During its 55th session, the Committee considered the admissibility of the communication. It noted that no submission under rule 91 had been received from the State party, in spite of a reminder addressed to it on 6 December 1994. The State party had merely forwarded a list with the names of individuals whose death sentences were commuted following the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Pratt and Morgan; the author’s name had been included in that list. While welcoming this information, the Committee noted that the author’s claims under the Covenant had not been made moot by the commutation of the death sentence. As the State party had failed to provide information under rule 91, due weight had to be given to the author’s allegations, to the extent that they had been sufficiently substantiated. 5.3 In assessing whether the mere length of detention on death row may constitute a violation of articles 7 and 10, the following factors must be considered: (a) The Covenant does not prohibit the death penalty, though it subjects its use to severe restrictions. As detention on death row is a necessary consequence of imposing the death penalty, no matter how cruel, degrading and inhuman it may appear to be, it cannot, of itself, be regarded as a violation of articles 7 and 10 of the Covenant. 4.2 As to the claims under articles 7 and 10, paragraph 1, the Committee observed that the State party had itself commuted the author’s death sentence, so as to comply with the guidelines formulated by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Pratt and Morgan v. AttorneyGeneral. The State party had not informed the Committee of the existence of any further remedies in respect of these claims; indeed, its silence in this respect constituted an admission that no such remedies existed. (b) While the Covenant does not prohibit the death penalty, the Committee has taken the view, which has been reflected in the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant, that article 6 "refers generally to abolition in terms which strongly suggest that abolition is desirable". Reducing recourse to the death penalty may therefore be seen as one of the objects and purposes of the Covenant. (c) The provisions of the Covenant must be interpreted in the light of the Covenant’s objects and purposes (article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). As one of these objects and purposes is to promote reduction in the use of the death penalty, an interpretation of a provision in the Covenant that may encourage a State party that retains the death penalty to make use of that penalty should, where possible, be avoided. 4.3 On 12 October 1995, the Committee declared the communication admissible in so far as it appeared to raise issues under articles 7 and 10, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. Examination of the merits 5.1 The State party’s deadline for the submission of information and observations under article 4, paragraph 2, of the Optional Protocol expired on 16 May 1996. No submission was received from the State party, in spite of a reminder addressed to it on 11 March 1997. The Committee regrets the lack of cooperation on the part of the State party. It has examined the present communication in the light of all the information made available by the parties, as provided for in article 5, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol. 5.4 In light of these factors, the Committee must examine the implications of holding the length of detention on death row, per se, to be in violation of articles 7 and 10. The first, and most serious, implication is that if a State party executes a condemned prisoner after he has spent a certain period of time on death row, it will not be in violation of its obligations under the Covenant, whereas if it refrains from doing so, it will violate the Covenant. An interpretation of the Covenant leading to this result cannot be consistent with the Covenant’s object and purpose. The above implication cannot be avoided by refraining from 5.2 The Committee must determine whether the length of the author’s detention on death row between April 1978 and December 1993 - amounts to a violation of articles 7 and 10 of the Covenant. Counsel alleges a violation of these provisions merely by reference to the length of detention the author was confined to death row at the State Prison 3 Views on communication No. 588/1994 (Errol Johnson v. Jamaica), adopted 22 March 1996, paragraphs 8.1 to 8.6. 87