for the purpose of balancing. The primary interest in Canadian law and jurisprudence is the protection of the public...”. relative sponsorships are almost always successful. This, according to her, may be true of family class sponsorships, but it is clearly not the case for assisted relative sponsorships, since assisted relative applicants must meet all the selection criteria for independent applicants. Counsel further dismisses as “patently wrong” the State party's argument that the Court, upon application for judicial review of a deportation order, may balance the hardship caused by removal against the public interest. The Court, as it has articulated repeatedly, cannot balance these interests, is limited to strict judicial review, and cannot substitute its own decision for that of the decision maker(s), even if it would have reached a different conclusion on the facts: it is limited to quashing a decision because of jurisdictional error, a breach of natural justice or fairness, an error of law, or an erroneous finding of fact made in a perverse or in a capricious manner (Sec. 18 (1) Federal Court Act). 6.8 Concerning the State party's contention that a “right to remain” may only come within the scope of application of the Covenant under exceptional circumstances, counsel claims that the process whereby the author's deportation was decided and confirmed proceeded without recognition or cognizance of the author's rights under articles 7, 9, 12, 13, 17 or 23. While it is true that Canada has a duty to ensure that society is protected, this legitimate interest must be balanced against other protected individual rights. 6.9 Counsel concedes that Mr. Stewart was given an opportunity, before the Immigration Appeal Division, to present all the circumstances of his case. She concludes, however, that domestic legislation and jurisprudence do not recognize that her client will be subjected to a breach of his fundamental rights if he were deported. This is because such rights are not and need not be considered given the way immigration legislation is drafted. Concepts such as home, privacy, family or residence in one's own country, which are protected under the Covenant, are foreign to Canadian law in the immigration context. The overriding concern in view of removal of a permanent resident, without distinguishing long-term residents from recently arrived immigrants, is national security. 6.5 As to the compatibility of the author's claims with the Covenant, counsel notes that Mr. Stewart is not claiming an absolute right to remain in Canada. She concedes that the Covenant does not per se recognize a right of non-nationals to enter or remain in a state. Nonetheless, it is submitted that the Covenant's provisions cannot be read in isolation but are inter-related: accordingly, article 13 must be read in the light of other provisions. 6.6 Counsel acknowledges that the Committee has held that article 13 provides for procedural and not for substantive protection; however, procedural protection cannot be interpreted in isolation from the protection provided under other provisions of the Covenant. Thus, legislation governing expulsion cannot discriminate on any of the grounds listed in article 26; nor can it arbitrarily or unlawfully interfere with family, privacy and home (article 17). Committee's admissibility decision 7.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of procedure, decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 6.7 As to the claim under article 17, counsel notes that the State party has only set out the provisions of the Immigration Act which provide for family reunification - provisions which she considers inapplicable to the author's case. She adds that article 17 imposes positive duties upon States parties, and that there is no law in Canada which would recognize family, privacy, or home interests in the context raised in the author's case. Furthermore, while she recognizes that there is a process provided by law which grants to the Immigration Appeal Division a general discretion to consider the personal circumstances of a permanent resident under order of deportation, this discretion does not recognize or encompass consideration of fundamental interests such as integrity of the family. Counsel refers to the case of Sutherland as an other example of the failure to recognize that integrity of the family is an important and protected interest. For counsel, there “can be no balancing of interests if ... family ... interests are not recognized as fundamental interests 7.2 The Committee noted that it was uncontested that there were no further domestic remedies for the author to exhaust, and that the requirements of article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol had been met. 7.3 In as much as the author's claims under articles 7 and 9 of the Covenant are concerned, the Committee examined whether the conditions of articles 2 and 3 of the Optional Protocol were met. In respect of articles 7 and 9, the Committee did not find, on the basis of the material before it, that the author had substantiated, for purposes of admissibility, his claim that deportation to the United Kingdom and separation from his family would amount to cruel or inhuman treatment within the meaning of article 7, or that it would violate his right to liberty and security of person within the meaning of article 9, paragraph 1. In this respect, therefore, the Committee decided that the author had 53