CAT/C/48/D/453/2011 not conclude that the self-incriminating statement was the result of the torture to which the complainant had been subjected, but nor do they rule it out. They note that his conviction was based on no evidence other than his self-incriminating statement, that the statement could be a source of evidence but not proof that the offences in question had been committed, and that it could not be submitted in court as testimony by the police officers who took it or heard it while it was being given. Under the case law of the Supreme Court, statements made in police stations do not in themselves constitute sufficient evidence. It was also incongruous that the Supreme Court should find that the complainant’s statements and alleged links with the ETA member to whom he had supposedly passed on information about the movements of Judge Lidón Corbi were insufficient as evidence to convict that person. 5.5 The complainant requests the Committee to rule that he is entitled to fair redress, including compensation, in conformity with article 14 of the Convention. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 6.1 Before considering an allegation in a communication, the Committee against Torture must decide whether or not the communication is admissible under article 22 of the Convention. The Committee has ascertained, as it is required to do under article 22, paragraph 5 (a), of the Convention, that the same matter has not been and is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 6.2 In accordance with article 22, paragraph 5 (b), of the Convention, the Committee does not consider any complaint unless it has ascertained that the complainant has exhausted all available domestic remedies. In the present case, the Committee takes note of the complaint of torture lodged by the author on 29 January 2003, the decision to stay the proceedings, the subsequent appeals against that decision and the decision of 30 March 2004 by the Provincial High Court of Álava to dismiss his subsidiary appeal. The Committee also takes note of the application for amparo for violations, inter alia, of his right to mental and physical integrity, filed by the complainant on 22 April 2004. This application was ruled inadmissible by the Constitutional Court on 23 June 2005, because the complainant’s legal representative had failed to comply with the requirement that he submit his credentials as the complainant’s legal representative. The complainant gives no explanation for the non-compliance with that requirement. 6.3 With regard to the criminal proceedings against the complainant, the Committee takes note of the conviction handed down by the National High Court on 12 December 2005 and of the Supreme Court’s ruling of 4 December 2006 on his application for cassation, which indicate that the complainant claimed at his trial by the Fourth Examining Magistrate of the National High Court and in his application for cassation to the Supreme Court that he had incriminated himself as a result of being tortured by the police. On 31 March 2008, the Constitutional Court rejected the application for amparo filed in response to the Supreme Court decision. 6.4 The Committee notes that the complainant did not exhaust domestic remedies in respect of his claim of having been tortured, because he did not comply with the legal requirements for the application for amparo to Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, the Committee notes that the complainant informed the competent courts during criminal proceedings against him that he had been tortured. Given that torture is an offence that must be prosecuted ex officio, in conformity with article 12 of the Convention, the Committee considers that there is no impediment under article 22, paragraph 5 (b), of the Convention to the admissibility of the communication. Given that the other admissibility requirements GE.12-43762 11